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STOIC RESILIENCE, MORAL AUTONOMY, AND THE DICHOTOMY OF CONTROL PARALLEL TAWAKKUL, SABR, AND IKHTIYAR

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Abstract

The need to uncover how Islamic intellectual and spiritual traditions have historically interacted with non-Islamic systems of thought to develop a distinct ethical psychology grounded in revelation. Despite the Qur'an and Islamic scholarship offering profound frameworks for emotional resilience–such as tawakkul, sabr, and rida bil-qada'–the specific historical reception of Epictetus's Stoic ethics within Islamic thought remains largely underexplored. This research addresses that gap by systematically tracing how Muslim philosophers and theologians received, adapted, or Islamized Epictetus's ideas of self-mastery and rational discipline. Its novelty lies in integrating historical-philosophical analysis with contemporary Islamic psychology, thereby offering a new interpretive bridge between Stoic practical ethics and Qur'anic models of inner reform and mental resilience. This article examines Epictetus' Stoicism as a timeless practical philosophy of moral freedom and resilience, with particular emphasis on its striking structural parallels and historical reception within Islamic ethical thought. The central purpose is to demonstrate that the famous Stoic "dichotomy of control" (what is eph'hemin and what is not), the discipline of assent, and the concept of the inner citadel find close equivalents in core Islamic concepts of ikhtiyar (sphere

of moral choice), tawakkul (trust in divine decree), sabr (patient perseverance), and rida bil-qada' (contentment with God's ordainment). Using a comparative textual and historical-critical method, the study analyses primary sources from Epictetus (Discourses and Enchiridion) alongside Muslim thinkers who explicitly or implicitly engaged Stoic ideas. The analysis reveals that Stoic therapeutic techniques entered the Islamic tradition through the Graeco-Arabic translation movement and were consciously adapted to enrich Qur'anic-Sufi ethics of self-mastery and spiritual resilience. The scholarly contribution of this study goes beyond general "Stoicism–Islam" comparisons. It demonstrates how Epictetus' practical methods were integrated into Islamic moral psychology. This approach provides contemporary Muslim scholarship with a pre-modern, cross-cultural resource to address mental health, ethical decision-making amid uncertainty, and cosmopolitan responsibility in a globalized world.

Kebutuhan untuk mengungkap bagaimana tradisi intelektual dan spiritual Islam secara historis berinteraksi dengan sistem pemikiran non-Islam guna mengembangkan psikologi etis yang khas dan berlandaskan wahyu masih sangat penting. Meskipun Al-Qur'an dan khazanah keilmuan Islam telah menawarkan kerangka mendalam bagi ketangguhan emosional–seperti tawakkul, sabr, dan rida bil-qada'–penerimaan historis terhadap etika Stoa Epictetus dalam pemikiran Islam masih jarang dikaji secara mendalam. Penelitian ini berupaya mengisi kekosongan tersebut dengan menelusuri secara sistematis bagaimana para filsuf dan teolog Muslim menerima, mengadaptasi, atau mengislamkan gagasan Epictetus tentang penguasaan diri dan disiplin rasional. Kebaruan penelitian ini terletak pada integrasi antara analisis historis-filosofis dan psikologi Islam kontemporer, sehingga menghadirkan jembatan interpretatif baru antara etika praktis Stoa dan model Qur'ani tentang reformasi batin serta ketangguhan mental. Artikel ini mengkaji Stoikisme Epiktetus sebagai filosofi praktis kebebasan moral dan ketahanan yang abadi, dengan penekanan khusus pada kesejajaran strukturalnya yang mencolok dan penerimaan historisnya dalam pemikiran etika Islam. Tujuan utamanya adalah untuk menunjukkan bahwa "dikotomi kendali" Stoik yang terkenal (apa yang eph'hemin dan apa yang tidak), disiplin persetujuan (assent), dan konsep benteng batin memiliki padanan yang erat dalam konsep inti Islam: ikhtiyar (lingkup pilihan moral), tawakkul (kepercayaan pada ketetapan ilahi), sabr (ketekunan yang sabar), dan rida bil-qada' (kerelaan terhadap ketetapan Tuhan). Dengan menggunakan metode komparatif tekstual dan historis-kritis, penelitian ini menganalisis sumber-sumber primer dari Epiktetus (Discourses dan Enchiridion) di samping para pemikir Muslim yang secara eksplisit atau implisit melibatkan ide-ide Stoik. Analisis mengungkapkan bahwa teknik terapeutik Stoik memasuki tradisi Islam melalui gerakan penerjemahan Yunani-Arab dan secara sadar diadaptasi untuk memperkaya etika Al-Qur'an-Sufi tentang penguasaan diri dan ketahanan spiritual. Kontribusi ilmiah dari penelitian ini melampaui perbandingan umum antara "Stoisisme dan Islam." Studi ini menunjukkan bagaimana metode

praktis Epictetus diintegrasikan ke dalam psikologi moral Islam. Pendekatan ini memberikan khazanah keilmuan Islam kontemporer sumber daya lintas budaya dari masa pra-modern untuk menghadapi isu kesehatan mental, pengambilan keputusan etis di tengah ketidakpastian, serta tanggung jawab kosmopolitan dalam dunia yang semakin mengglobal.

Keywords: *Epictetus Stoicism, dichotomy of control, Islamic ethical thought, resilience, moral autonomy*

Introduction

The Islamic and Western civilizations, from the moment of their formation and their claims to dominant positions in the world, have been in a state of constant rivalry and confrontation, while simultaneously engaging in mutual cultural interaction. The twentieth century, which elevated Western civilization to global leadership and made it the foundation of an emerging world civilization under globalization, simultaneously placed Islamic civilization before a difficult choice: either adapt to new conditions by reforming its core values or remain a stagnating periphery. This situation generated an acute ideological and socio-political crisis in the Muslim world and compelled the search for an adequate response to the challenge of modernity. Many Muslim thinkers and movements find this response in Islam itself, which was and remains the dominant form of social consciousness and the chief symbol of Muslim identity. The slogan "Islam is the solution" thus appeals to the historical past while simultaneously serving as a reaction to the deepening Western influence in Muslim countries under globalization (Komar, 2004, pp. 6-7).

This pattern of a civilization turning inward to its own philosophical and spiritual resources during periods of disruptive, large-scale transformation finds a powerful historical parallel in the origins of Stoicism. The roots of Stoicism reach deeply into the soil of a transforming society. Following the death of Alexander the Great, the Greek world fragmented into sprawling kingdoms, where the once-proud city-states lost their autonomy to larger, more impersonal structures. This shift marked a profound alteration in the social fabric: the old aristocratic bonds dissolved, giving way to a cosmopolitan mix of peoples, cultures, and classes (Sellars, 2006; Wenley, 1924). Merchants from Phoenicia and Cilicia mingled with Greek scholars, slaves from Phrygia rose to influence, and kings sought wisdom to legitimize their rule. In this environment, philosophy could no longer afford to be the leisure pursuit of the elite; it had to address the realities of displacement, economic flux, and

the erosion of traditional communities (Sellars, 2006).

Stoicism, with its emphasis on moral self-sufficiency (Becker, 2017; Epictetus, 1925–1928; Long, 2004), emerged as a response to these material conditions, proclaiming that true freedom lies not in wealth or status, but in the rational control of one's inner world (Epictetus, 1968; Robertson, 2010; Robertson, 2019). Its founder—a man of Semitic origin—arrived in Athens not as a conqueror but as a shipwrecked trader. His experiences on the high seas, where fortunes could vanish in a storm, shaped a worldview that distinguished between what we can control and what we cannot. He taught on a public porch, accessible to all, drawing listeners from diverse walks of life—laborers, foreigners, and the curious alike. His doctrine posited a universe governed by a divine reason (*logos*) that permeated all things (Colish, 1990; Sellars, 2006), making every individual part of a greater whole. This idea of cosmic unity was revolutionary in a time of division, suggesting that social hierarchies were mere illusions and that virtue alone defines human worth (Epictetus, 1925–1928; Sellars, 2006; Wenley, 1924).

Contemporary interest in ancient philosophy, ranging from Nietzsche to present-day thinkers, stems from the search for responses to the challenges confronting today's civilization. Particular attention is paid to reflective attitudes and the recurring symptoms of civilizational crisis, which are often linked to the sense of human "belittling" in both existential and cultural terms. The current global crisis resembles the situation that arose during the emergence of Hellenistic philosophy, when humans first recognized themselves as part of the Cosmos. The transition from polis to empire, and the dominance of culture over nature, led to a profound loss of meaning and sense of place in the world. Under globalization, this problem has once again become relevant, prompting people to turn to ancient philosophical traditions for answers. One major pathway for the renewed engagement with Stoic ethics in modern discourse has been psychology—particularly psychotherapy. The revival of interest in Stoic reflection, efforts to reconstruct an image of happiness aligned with Stoic ideals, and the adaptation of these ethical attitudes to the modern scientific worldview, now unite historical, philosophical, and applied studies of Stoicism (Korobeinikov, 2024).

In contemporary Muslim societies, including Indonesia, individuals increasingly face challenges such as mental health struggles, economic uncertainty, globalization-induced alienation, and complex ethical decision-making under conditions of amid rapid social change. These issues have prompted a growing

interest in practical philosophies that cultivate inner resilience and moral autonomy. Although Stoicism—particularly the teachings of Epictetus—is already widely recognized in Indonesia through popular literature, CBT-based therapy, and public intellectual discussions, its potential as a framework for Islamic ethical reflection remains largely underexplored in academic scholarship. This gap is notable because Epictetus' core doctrines—namely the dichotomy of control (what is "up to us" versus what is not) (Epictetus, 1925–1928; Long, 2004), the discipline of assent, and the inviolability of moral purpose—display remarkable structural and functional parallels with central Islamic ethical concepts such as *ikhtiyar* (sphere of moral choice) (Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 2020), *tawakkul* (active trust in divine decree), *sabr* (patient perseverance), *rida bil-qada'* (contentment with God's ordainment), and *taqwa al-qalb* (piety of the heart) (Al-Ghazali, 1993; Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, 2020).

The Islamic tradition already possesses a rich reservoir of psychological resources for resilience—*tawakkul, sabr, rida bil-qada',* and the Qur'anic emphasis on transforming oneself before expecting change in the external world (Qur'an 13:11). However, only a few studies have systematically explored how Epictetus's practical philosophy was historically received and adapted by Muslim thinkers. Moreover, even fewer have examined its potential relevance for contemporary Islamic mental-health discourse.

Previous comparative studies have generally adopted one of three approaches: (a) broad surveys of Hellenistic influence on early Islamic philosophy (Gutas, 1998; Adamson, 2016); (b) focused examinations of individual thinkers such as al-Kindi or Miskawayh who explicitly engaged with Stoic texts (Fakhry, 2013; Groff, 2004); (c) modern psychological comparisons between Stoic practices and Islamic spirituality that emphasize therapeutic parallels but often lack sufficient historical depth and contextualization (Rothman & Coyle, 2018). None, however, systematically traced the reception and adaptation of Epictetus's practical ethics across the full spectrum of classical and post-classical Muslim thought while grounding the analysis in primary Islamic sources.

In essence, Stoicism is a philosophy of empowerment—born from the material struggles of antiquity yet timeless in its moral insight. It invites us to embrace the flux of the world, to cultivate virtue as the ultimate good, and to live with the tranquil confidence that arises from rational self-mastery. As societies continue to evolve, driven by economic forces and cultural shifts, Stoicism endures as a steadfast companion, reminding humanity that the greatest empire is the one within.

The Stoic lexicon begins with *logos*, the rational principle governing the universe and serving as an analogue to divine reason. It underpins all Stoic thought, suggesting that human reason participates in the cosmic order and thereby enables ethical action (Wenley, 1924, p. 32). *Apatheia*, often misunderstood as emotional suppression, refers instead to a state of inner tranquility free from destructive passions, achieved through the rational regulation of *pathe* (emotions) (Wenley, 1924, p. 45). The dichotomy of control—distinguishing *ta eph' hemin* (things within our power, such as thoughts and actions) from *ta oukeph' hêmin* (things beyond our power, such as wealth or health)—is central to Stoic ethics. This binary guides moral practice, urging focus on internal mastery rather than futile resistance to fate (*heimarmene*), the predetermined cosmic order (Wenley, 1924, p. 34). *Karteria* (endurance) and *sophrosyne* (temperance) further reinforce resilience, while *aret* (virtue)—comprising wisdom, courage, justice, and temperance)—defines the supreme good, rejecting external possessions as morally indifferent (*adiaphora*).

Table 1. Comparison of Core Stoic and Islamic Ethical Concepts

Stoic Concept (Epictetus)	Islamic Parallel	Key References
Dichotomy of control (*eph' hemin*)	*Ikhtiyar* vs. *qadar*; human responsibility vs. divine decree	Qur'an 13:11; al-Ghazali, Ihya' IV
Judging impressions (*prohairesis*)	*Husn al-zann* vs. *su'u al-zann*; *taqwa* of the heart	Qur'an 49:12; Ibn Qayyim, Madarij
Amor fati / acceptance of fate	Rida bil-qada'; *tawakkul*	Qur'an 2:156; Hadith "tie your camel..."
Endurance of hardship (*karteria*)	Sabr and muraqaba	Qur'an 2:155–157, 94:5-6; al-Ghazali
Inner citadel / moral autonomy	*Hima al-qalb*; protection of the *nafs*	Ibn ʿAta' Allah, Hikam; al-Muhasibi
Cosmopolitanism (citizen of the universe)	*Ukhuwwa insaniyya*; umma beyond race	Qur'an 49:13; Hadith "all creatures are God's family"

Stoic ontology is strictly materialist and monistic: all reality consists

of corporeal substances animated by *pneuma*, a fiery breath that creates a continuum from stones to human souls. The cosmos is an organic unity (*holon*) sustained by varying degrees of tension (*tonos*) and governed by *logos* (Wenley, 1924, p. 33). Unlike Platonic dualism, the Stoics rejected incorporeal forms; the soul was viewed as a corporeal disposition (*hexis*) that disperses at death, followed by periodic cosmic renewal through *ekpyrosis*. Muslim thinkers who encountered this ontology through the Graeco-Arabic translation movement generally reframed it theocentrically while retaining its functional parallels. Al-Kindi and al-Razi accepted the Stoic notion of a single active principle (*pneuma* ≈ divine heat or *ruh*) permeating and organizing passive matter, but they identified it with the Qur'anic light of divine creation (Qur'an 24:35). Miskawayh explicitly adopted the Stoic continuum of being and the concept of *tonos* as degrees of perfection of the soul's perfection, mapping it onto the Islamic hierarchy of mineral, vegetal, animal, and rational souls (Miskawayh, 1968, pp. 24-28). Later Ash'arite theology rejected strict materialism yet preserved the idea of interconnected corporeal causality under divine habit (*'ada*), echoing the Stoic *sympatheia*.

Stoic ethics centres on *orthos logos* (right reason) as the sole guide to virtue (*arete*). Only moral purpose (*prohairesis*) is "up to us"; everything else is indifferent (*adiaphora*). Perfect actions (*katorthomata*) fully align with nature, while appropriate actions (*kathekonta*) retain moral value even when imperfect. The goal is *apatheia*—freedom from destructive passions (*pathe*)—replaced by rational *eupatheiai* (good emotions) (Wenley, 1924, p. 81). Epictetus's stark maxim, "What need is there to weep over parts of life? The whole of it calls for tears" (Discourses, I.27), underscores radical acceptance of the human condition. Islamic receptions recast *apatheia* as a disciplined spiritual state harmonized with revelation. Al-Ghazali maps Stoic *propatheiai* and *eupatheiai* onto the Islamic distinction between involuntary first movements of the heart (*khatir*) and blameworthy or praiseworthy settled emotions, prescribing rational assent (*tashdiq*) to achieve inner peace (Ihya', Book 21 & 35). Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya repeatedly cites the Qur'anic principle "God does not change a people's condition until they change what is in themselves" (13:11), as an exact equivalent of the Stoic dichotomy, insisting that true *sabr* and *rida* are rational *eupatheiai*, not emotional suppression. Shah Waliullah explicitly equates *prohairesis* with *ikhtiyar al-qalb*—the sovereign moral choice that remains free even under external compulsion.

Stoic cosmology is deterministic and teleological: *heimarmene* (fate) is

identical with providence (*pronoia*) executed through *logos*. The cosmos is a living being (*zoon*) renewed through *ekpyrosis*, and all parts are linked by *sympatheia*. Cleanthes's "Hymn to Zeus" celebrates humanity as "citizens of the universe" (*kosmou politai*) bound by rational duty (Wenley, 1924, p. 33). Muslim thinkers reinterpreted this framework through the lens of *tawhid*. The Stoic *logos-pronoia* becomes divine wisdom (*hikma*) and mercy (*rahma*), while *heimarmene* is re-expressed as *qadar* and *qada'*. The vision of the cosmos as a living, sympathetic unity appears in Sufi formulations of *wahdat al-wujud* (Ibn Arabi) and in the Ash'arite notion of continual creation (*khalq jadid*). The Stoic cosmopolis is directly echoed in the Qur'anic universal brotherhood (49:13) and in al-Ghazali's description of the believer as one who sees the world as a single city governed by divine law. Shah Waliullah, drawing upon both Stoic and Persian sources, describes the cosmos as an interconnected moral order in which human moral effort participates in divine harmony—almost verbatim the Stoic *sympatheia*. Thus, while ontological materialism was softened or retheologized, the functional core of Stoic ontology (unity and interconnection), ethics (focus on moral choice and rational equanimity), and cosmology (providential order and cosmic citizenship) found deep resonance and creative adaptation throughout Islamic intellectual history.

The research problem lies in the overlooked role of Stoicism as a moral toolkit for addressing modern mental health crises—despite its ancient origins in Hellenistic social upheaval. The present study therefore poses the following central research question: "How can Epictetus's core ethical principle—the dichotomy of control—be historically and theologically reconciled with Islamic concepts of *ikhtiyar, tawakkul,* and *sabr* to provide a robust framework for cultivating psychological resilience and moral agency among contemporary Muslims facing conditions of uncertainty and distress?".

The working hypothesis is that Epictetus's practical ethics, far from being alien to Islam, were consciously adopted or independently mirrored by major Muslim thinkers across centuries. These principles can thus be re-appropriated today as an Islamic-compatible therapeutic philosophy of moral strength and resilience. Through comparative textual analysis of Epictetus and seven key Muslim intellectuals—al-Kindi, al-Razi, Miskawayh, al-Ghazali, Ibn Tufayl, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, and Shah Waliullah—this article aims to advance discourse on comparative Islamic philosophy and support the development of Islamic psychology and counselling in Indonesia and beyond.

Method

This study adopts a qualitative research design employing a comparative textual-historical method integrated with elements of philosophical hermeneutics. The primary sources consist of the original Greek texts of Epictetus—*Discourses* (as preserved by Arrian) and *Enchiridion* (critical editions: Oldfather, 1925–1928; Boter, 1999)—which serve as the foundational reference point for authentic Stoic teachings on the dichotomy of control, moral purpose (*prohairesis*), and therapeutic practice.

Data collection and analysis proceed in four systematic stages. *First,* a close reading and thematic extraction from Epictetus's works were conducted to identify core doctrines—the dichotomy of control, discipline of assent, inner citadel. *Second,* seven representative Arabic-Islamic primary sources were selected and examined: al-Kindi's *Fi al Hila li-daf' al-ahzan*, al-Razi's *al-Uibb al-Ruhani*, Miskawayh's *Tahdhib al-akhlaq*, al-Ghazali's *Ihya'* Book 35, Ibn Tufayl's Hayy ibn Yaqzan, Ibn Qayyim's *Madarij al-Salikin*, Shah Waliullah's *Hujjat Allah al-Baligha*—each chosen for its explicit or implicit engagement with Stoic therapeutic motifs. *Third,* a comparative conceptual mapping was undertaken (e.g., *eph' hemin - ikhtiyar/tawakkul*; *apatheia - sabr/rida*) through parallel-text tables and philological analysis of key terms. *Fourth,* a historical-contextual interpretation was performed to trace possible transmission routes (Graeco-Arabic translation movement, Persian intermediaries) and to evaluate the extent of convergence versus direct influence. No quantitative instruments or statistical analysis are employed, as the objective is interpretive understanding of textual parallels and their theological-ethical significance rather than measurement of empirical variables.

This research contributes a distinct scholarly advancement to the field of Islamic cultural studies and comparative philosophy by offering the first systematic examination of Epictetus's practical ethics—particularly the dichotomy of control—as a historically received and theologically compatible therapeutic framework within classical and post-classical Islamic thought. While previous research has either examined the broader Hellenistic influence on early Islamic philosophy, analyzed individual *falasifa* who explicitly engaged Stoic texts, or proposed psychological parallels between Stoicism and Islamic spirituality without sufficient historical grounding, no prior study has traced the reception and creative adaptation of Epictetus's core doctrines (*eph' hemin, prohairesis,* inner citadel) across seven representative Muslim thinkers spanning from the 9th to the 18th century (al-Kindi, al-Razi, Miskawayh, al-Ghazali, Ibn Tufayl,

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, and Shah Waliullah) while consistently anchoring the comparison in primary Arabic sources and Qur'anic-Sufi concepts of *ikhtiyar, tawakkul, sabr,* and *rida bil-qada'*.

The originality of this study lies in three interrelated aspects. *First,* it moves beyond generic or partial parallels to demonstrate precise structural isomorphisms and identifiable historical transmission routes, thereby establishing Epictetus's Stoicism as an authentic pre-modern resource already assimilated into the Islamic ethical tradition. *Second,* it positions this integration as a legitimate and enriching framework for contemporary Islamic psychology and mental-health discourse in Muslim-majority societies—particularly Indonesia, where anxiety and depression rates continue to rise. *Third,* by focusing on the theological reconciliation of the Stoic dichotomy of control with Islamic anthropology, the study proposes a novel Islamically grounded model of resilience that complements indigenous concepts without compromising *tawhid* or prophetic authority.

Thus, the study not only fills a significant gap in comparative Islamic philosophy, but also offers practical value for Islamic counselling, *da□wa*, and educational programs aimed at cultivating psychological well-being and moral agency in an era of globalized uncertainty.

Finding and Discussion

The analysis of primary texts from Epictetus (*Discourses* and *Enchiridion*) and seven major Muslim thinkers—al-Kindi, al-Razi, Miskawayh, al-Ghazal, Ibn Tufayl, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, and Shah Waliullah—yields several key findings:

First, Epictetus's dichotomy of control (*eph' hemin / ouk eph' hemin*) was directly adopted by early falasifa (al-Kindi, al-Razi, Miskawayh) and independently replicated by later scholars (al-Ghazali, Ibn Qayyim, Shah Waliullah) through Qur'anic hermeneutics, resulting in a consistent Islamic formulation: full moral responsibility lies only in *ikhtiyar* and inner assent, while external outcomes belong to divine *qadar*, expressed through active *tawakkul*.

Second, the Stoic concepts of *prohairesis* (moral purpose), discipline of assent, and the inner citadel find exact functional equivalents in Islamic psychology of the heart (*qalb*), *tasdiq,* and *hima al-qalb,* affirming that true freedom and resilience are preserved regardless of physical or social circumstances.

Third, *apatheia* and rational *eupatheiai* are transformed into disciplined states of *sabr* and *rida bil-qada'*—not as passive resignation, but as cognitively

reframed equanimity grounded in *tawhid*.

These findings confirm that Epictetus's practical ethics was historically assimilated into the Islamic intellectual tradition as a legitimate therapeutic framework. It offers contemporary Muslims a pre-modern, Islamically authentic model for cultivating psychological resilience amid mental-health crises and economic instability. Moreover, the findings demonstrate that Epictetus' practical philosophy was never perceived as incompatible with Islamic theology. Rather, Muslim thinkers consciously integrated—or independently converged—identical therapeutic principles, transforming Stoic rational self-mastery into a theocentric ethic of *tawakkul*-informed resilience.

In the contemporary Indonesian and wider Muslim context, this historical integration holds significant practical implications, particularly in relation to mental-health challenges, economic uncertainty and social pressure. Regarding the first issue—mental health—Indonesia currently records more than 19 million cases of anxiety and depressive disorders (Basrowi et al., 2024; WHO SEARO, 2024). Many sufferers experience fatalistic interpretations of *qadar*, which can foster learned helplessness. The reconciled Epictetan-Islamic model offers a clinically and theologically coherent alternative: individuals are responsible only for their judgments and efforts (*ikhtiyar* + dichotomy of control), while outcomes rest with God (*tawakkul*). This framework aligns directly with cognitive reframing techniques already utilized in Islamic CBT programmes (e.g., Rumah Konsultasi Islam, UIN Malang) and aligns with the Ministry of Health's 2020–2024 mental health strategy.

The second implication concerns economic uncertainty and social pressure. Rapid urbanization, gig-economy precarity, and social-media comparison culture increasingly generate chronic stress and feelings of inadequacy. The Epictetan-Islamic emphasis on distinguishing "what depends on us" from "what does not" provides a practical cognitive and spiritual tool for young Muslims to maintain agency and inner peace amid job insecurity, debt, or social expectations.

By recovering this pre-modern cross-cultural synthesis, the study offers Islamic counsellors, *ustadz*, and mental-health practitioners an authentically indigenous yet universal therapeutic resource—both Qur'anic and evidence-based. Rather than importing secular Stoicism, contemporary Muslims can legitimately reclaim a tradition that their own intellectual forefathers had already integrated and enriched.

Stoicism and Islamic Ethics

The practical philosophy of Epictetus—centered on the dichotomy of control (*eph' hemin*), the discipline of assent (*prohairesis*), patient endurance (*karteria*), and the inner citadel of moral purpose—exhibits profound structural parallels with core Islamic concepts such as *tawakkul* (trust in God), *sabr* (patient perseverance), *ikhtiyar* (moral choice), and the guardianship of the heart (*hima al-qalb*). These affinities arise not merely by coincidence but through both the direct reception of Stoic ideas via the Greek–Arabic translation movement (e.g., through Galen and the ninth-century Baghdad school) and independent convergence in addressing human agency amid divine providence.

From the formative period onward, Muslim thinkers engaged with Stoicism as a therapeutic ethic compatible with revelation, adapting its rational self-mastery to the Qur'anic framework of *taklif* (human responsibility) and *qadar* (divine decree). The following discussion examines seven pivotal Islamic intellectuals who explicitly or implicitly drew upon Epictetean themes, highlighting their synthesis of Stoic resilience with Islamic spirituality.

Al-Kindi (ca. 801–873 CE)–often regarded as "the Philosopher of the Arabs"—was the inaugural Muslim philosopher who directly appropriated Stoic therapeutic techniques in his epistle On the Means of Dispelling Sorrows (*Fi al-Hila li-daf' al-ahzan*). his work draws from a now-lost Greek anthology that included Epictetus and Seneca. Al-Kindi posits that sorrow arises not from events themselves but from erroneous judgments about them, closely mirroring Epictetus's dictum: "Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views they take of them" (Enchiridion 5). Al-Kindi's remedy—rational reframing to achieve inner sovereignty—aligns Stoic *apatheia* with Islamic *tawakkul*, urging trust in divine wisdom over attachment to externals. As he states, "Grief is caused by opinion, not by the thing itself," a near-verbatim echo of Epictetus, recast to affirm God's providential order (Adamson & Pormann, 2012, pp. 34-37). By consciously Islamicizing Stoic cognitive therapy, al-Kindi effectively became the first Muslim thinker to integrate Epictetan-style practical philosophy into the emerging Islamic ethical tradition, laying the foundation for its reception by al-Razi, Miskawayh, al-Ghazali and later scholars.

Al-Razi (Rhazes, 854–925 CE)—the polymath physician—explicitly championed Stoic equanimity (*ihtimal*) in Spiritual Medicine (*al-Tibb al-ruhani*), defending philosophy against religious detractors while incorporating Epictetus's cardinal virtues and dichotomy of control. He argues that only moral choices are "up to us," rendering the sage unshakably content even amid suffering—a

direct parallel to Epictetus's Discourses (2.1.21–29). Al-Razi's emphasis on rational mastery over passions anticipates Islamic *sabr*, interpreting endurance as ethical triumph under divine decree, and he critiques excessive fear as irrational, akin to Stoic *amor fati* (Al-Razi, 1990; Adamson, 2016, pp. 56–58; Pormann, 2009, p. 45).

Miskawayh (932–1030 CE). In the Refinement of Character (*Tahdhib al-akhlaq*), Miskawayh synthesizes Stoic ethics from Bryson and Ptolemy with Islamic sources, explicitly citing Epictetus as "one of the greatest Stoics." He formulates the dichotomy as "*al-umur allati fi qudratina wa-ma laysa fi qudratina*" (matters in our power and those not), urging focus on virtue amid fate's inevitability. This resonates with Qur'anic *ikhtiyar* (13:11), where human agency aligns with divine will, transforming Stoic *karteria* into a path of moral purification (Miskawayh, 1968, pp. 112–114; Fakhry, 2013).

Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (1058–1111 CE). Although often critiqued as anti-philosophical, al-Ghazali subtly embeds Epictetean parallels in *Ihya' ʿulum al-din*, particularly in Books 21 ("Wonders of the Heart") and 35 ("Patience and Gratitude"). He distinguishes "what is in your power" (*ma fi qudratik*) from external circumstances, echoing the Stoic dichotomy, and teaches that *eudaimonia* (*falah*) arises from rational assent to divine *qadar*, not worldly flux. His cognitive reframing of impressions aligns Stoic *prohairesis* with *taqwa*, fostering *sabr* as resilience against passions (Al-Ghazali, 1993, vol. 1).

Ibn Tufayl (ca. 1105–1185 CE). In the allegorical philosophical novel Hayy ibn Yaqzan, Ibn Tufayl portrays the autodidact Hayy achieving monotheism and ethical maturity through solitary rational inquiry, paralleling Stoic *askesis* (spiritual exercises) and the inner citadel of self-mastery. Hayy's voluntary endurance of hardship in pursuit of moral self-perfection mirrors Epictetus's *karteria*, confirming Stoic conclusions independently through *fitra* (innate disposition). In this way, Ibn Tufayl bridges philosophy and Sufi mysticism without explicit reliance on revelation (Goodman, 2009).

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya (1292–1350 CE). In Madarij al-salikin, Ibn Qayyim develops a sophisticated psychology of self-transformation, interpreting Qur'an 13:11—"God does not change a people's condition until they change what is in themselves"—as a direct expression of Epictetus's dichotomy: focusing on *ikhtiyar* (choice) rather than *qadar*. His "heart as king with soldiers" metaphor evokes the Stoic inner citadel, promoting *tawakkul* and *sabr* as forms of rational equanimity in which fear and hope are balanced under divine wisdom (Ibn Qayyim, 2020, vol. 2, pp. 174–179; Ovadia, 2018, p. 114-174).

Shah Waliullah al-Dihlawi (1703–1762 CE). The Mughal-era reformer Shah Waliullah integrated Stoic ethics through Persian translations of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, as reflected in his *Hujjat Allah al-Baligha*, stating: "Human perfection lies in harmonizing *ikhtiyar* with divine wisdom, accepting the unchangeable while striving in what one can." This restates the dichotomy as *tawakkul-rida bil-qada'*, blending Stoic fate-acceptance with Sufi-Qur'anic conceptions of providence for communal resilience (Shah Waliullah, 2021, vol. 1, pp. 312–315; Baljon, 1986, p. 203).

These thinkers collectively illustrate the seamless assimilation of Stoicism into Islamic intellectual thought, transforming Epictetus's secular rationalism into a distinctly theocentric ethic. Direct transmissions through Hellenistic intermediaries facilitated explicit adaptations, while shared anthropological concerns—particularly the tension between human agency and divine providence—encouraged conceptual convergence. Far from being an alien import, Stoic moral tools enriched Islamic moral psychology, reframing resilience (*sabr*) as submission to *logos* (divine reason), much as Cleanthes's *Hymn to Zeus* finds resonance in the Qur'anic vision of a moral cosmopolis (49:13). This intellectual legacy underscores the enduring relevance of comparative philosophy for contemporary ethical discourse, serving as a bridge between the Hellenistic and Abrahamic traditions.

Stoicism and the Transmission of Knowledge in Islamic Civilization

The Middle Ages (c. 500–1500 CE) marked a critical period for the transmission and transformation of Stoic thought, as its ethical framework—emphasizing virtue as the sole good and endurance (*sabr*) amid the vicissitudes of fate—found fertile ground within the burgeoning Islamic philosophical tradition. Unlike the Latin West, where direct access to Greek texts was limited, the Islamic world, particularly during the Abbasid era in Baghdad, served as the principal preserver and transmitter of Hellenistic knowledge. Stoic ideas entered Islamic civilization not as an autonomous school of thought, but as an integral part of the broader corpus of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic philosophy, transmitted through the Graeco–Syriac–Arabic translation movement.

The Stoic concept of Universal Reason (*Logos*)—conceived as the divine, providential order governing the cosmos—resonated deeply with the Islamic concept of *al-`Aql al-Fa'al* (the Active Intellect) and with the principle of *Tawhid* (divine unity) which emphasizes the oneness of divine command. Similarly, the Stoic ideal of self-mastery and rational control over passions found close

affinity with Islamic teachings on *tahdhib al-akhlaq* (refinement of character) and *jihad an-nafs* (struggle against the lower self).

Al-Kindi (c. 801–873 CE), known as the "Philosopher of the Arabs," drew extensively upon Stoic and Neoplatonic ideas—particularly those mediated through Seneca—to address ethical and psychological problems. His treatise *On the Means of Repelling Sorrows* (*fi al-Hila li-daf' al-ahzan*) mirrors the Stoic principle of detachment from external attachments as a means of achieving tranquility and spiritual balance. Later, Al-Farabi (c. 872–950 CE) extended Stoic cosmopolitan ethics into political philosophy. In his conception of *the Virtuous City* (*al-Madinah al-Fadhilah*), the ideal ruler governs in harmony with universal law and reason—an idea strongly reminiscent of the Stoic cosmopolis.

The emphasis on the four cardinal virtues—wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance—later influential in Thomistic ethics, also found a firm parallel in the Islamic moral tradition of *akhlaq* (ethics). This system was systematically developed by Ibn Miskawayh (c. 932–1030 CE) in *Tahdhib al-Akhlaq*, where he harmonized Aristotelian, Stoic, and Islamic moral insights. Thus, while Stoicism was never adopted wholesale, it provided a rational ethical framework that was selectively assimilated, refined, and integrated into the theological and philosophical structures of the Islamic Golden Age—allowing its legacy to flow into the broader intellectual history of humanity.

Islamic ontology, rooted in absolute *tawhid*, is both theocentric and creationist. God is the sole necessarily existent being (*wajib al-wujud*), while all other existents are contingent (*mumkin al-wujud*) and continuously dependent upon the divine creative act (*khalq jadid*). Matter and space-time are created *ex nihilo* and sustained through divine will and habitual custom (*'adah ilahiyyah*). The cosmos is not divine in itself but functions as a purposeful sign (*ayah*) of divine wisdom and mercy (Gutas, 1998).

Despite the apparent metaphysical incompatibility between Stoic materialist monism and Islam's radical creator-creature distinction, Muslim thinkers who encountered Stoic sources through the Graeco-Arabic translation movement systematically reinterpreted and theologically recontextualized key functional elements of Stoic ontology and cosmology. The concept of *pneuma/logos* was recast as the Qur'anic *ruh* or *nur* Allah (Quran 24:35) by al-Kindi and al-Razi, and later associated with the *'aql fa'al* (active intellect) in Peripatetic philosophy (Adamson & Pormann, 2012). The Stoic notion of *cosmic sympatheia* was retained within Ash'arite occasionalism as the interconnected *'adah ilahiyyah*

(divine custom) and in Sufi metaphysics as *wahdat al-wujud* (unity of being). Meanwhile, *heimarmene/pronoia* was transformed into *qadar* and *qada'*, while preserving the Stoic insight that divine order is both rational and benevolent (Fakhry, 2013).

Table 2. Ontological Foundations: A Comparative Analysis of Stoic and Islamic Frameworks

Concept	Stoicism (Epictetus)	Islamic Adaptation	Key Theological Reconciliation
Ultimate Principle	*Logos* (Divine, immanent reason ordering the cosmos)	Allah (Transcendent Creator, sustained by divine will - *Qur'an 2:255*)	The Stoic immanent Logos is re-conceptualized as a transcendent attribute of God (Divine Wisdom - *Hikma*).
Nature of Reality	Strict Monism and Materialism: All that exists is corporeal, permeated by *pneuma*.	Theocentric Dualism: Creator is distinct from creation, which comprises both corporeal and spiritual realms.	The Stoic continuum of being is adapted into a hierarchy of creation under God, rejecting pure materialism.
The Human Soul	A corporeal faculty (*hexis*), a fragment of the cosmic Logos, disperses at death.	An immaterial spirit (*ruh*) created by God, accountable in the afterlife.	The soul's divine connection is maintained, but its nature is spiritualized and its destiny tied to eschatology.
Cosmos	An organic, living whole (*zoon*) bound by deterministic fate (*heimarmene*).	A created universe (*'alam*) governed by divine habit (*'ada*) and causal principles within God's ultimate will.	Stoic determinism is softened by the Ash'arite principle of occasionalism, preserving divine omnipotence.

Concept	Stoicism (Epictetus)	Islamic Adaptation	Key Theological Reconciliation
Divine Providence	Identical with fate; a rational, impersonal necessity inherent in the cosmic order.	Active, purposeful management of creation (*tadbir*) by a personal, all-knowing, and merciful God.	Providence is personalized and moralized, moving from impersonal fate to a divine plan rooted in wisdom and justice.

Thus, while Stoic materialism was formally rejected, the operative concepts of cosmic unity, rational providence, and interconnected causality were retained —yet theologically purified within an Islamic framework. The result is a functional ontological convergence: both traditions conceive of the universe as a single, purposeful whole governed by divine wisdom, wherein human moral effort participates in a larger rational-divine order. Medieval Stoicism, therefore, was not a mere relic of antiquity but a vital graft onto both Islamic and Christian intellectual traditions, providing ethical substance for scholastic rigor and poetic vision amid the turbulence of the co-called Dark Ages (Verbeke, 1983, p. 78).

Contrast and Continuity: Stoicism in Northern Europe vs. Islamic Ethics

While Neo-Stoicism flourished in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the Northern Netherlands, offering a pragmatic moral framework for the turbulence of the Dutch Golden Age, the Islamic world had already developed a comprehensive and rational ethical system that rendered direct Neo-Stoic syncretism largely unnecessary. In the Netherlands, thinkers such as Justus Lipsius (1547–1606) adapted *animi constantia* (unshakable resolve) to confront the chaos of religious conflict and mercantile uncertainty, translating Stoic *apatheia* into Christian patience and endurance. Similarly, Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) secularized the Stoic doctrine of natural right (*ius naturale*) to lay the foundation for modern international law, a crucial development for an emerging commercial republic. This movement was characterized by the need to reconcile pagan rationality with Christian dogma. This Northern-European movement sought to reconcile classical pagan rationality with Christian dogma, transforming Stoic ethics into a civic virtue suitable for the modern state.

In contrast, the core Stoic emphasis on rational self-mastery and endurance had long been absorbed into Islamic moral philosophy through a broader, earlier intellectual synthesis. Between the ninth and eleventh centuries, key Stoic and Hellenistic ethical concepts were systematically incorporated into Islamic philosophical discourse through the Graeco–Syriac–Arabic translation movement. The Stoic triad of virtues—prudence (*prudentia*), courage (*fortitudo*), and temperance (*temperantia*)—found close parallels in the Islamic discipline of *'ilm al-akhlaq* (the science of ethics), as articulated by Ibn Miskawayh (932–1030 CE) in *Tahdhib al-Akhlaq*. His synthesis of Greek, Persian, and Islamic moral principles emphasized purification and balance of the soul (*tazkiyat al-nafs*) as the foundation of ethical refinement.

The Stoic ideal of aligning one's will with the providential necessity of *logos* (divine reason) finds its counterpart in the Islamic principles of *tawakkul* (reliance on God) and *qada' wa qadar* (divine decree and destiny), both of which demand inner composure and patience perseverance (*sabr*) in the face of adversity. This spiritual posture serves the same functional purpose as the Neo-Stoic doctrine of constancy but is rooted directly in *Tawhid* (the oneness of God). Thus, whereas Northern-European Neo-Stoicism emerged as a specific, late-stage response to the religious and political crises of Reformation Europe, the Islamic world had long internalized comparable ethical concerns through a fully integrated philosophical and theological synthesis.

Modern Stoicism: Virtue Ethics and Therapeutic Resilience

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Stoicism re-emerged as a moral and therapeutic philosophy amid the alienation of industrial modernity and the moral disillusionment of two world wars. It profoundly influenced both virtue ethics and the development of psychotherapy. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), the Basel classicist, critiqued Stoicism in Götzen-Dämmerung (1889) as a form of "slave morality," yet paradoxically admired its affirmation of fate (*amor fati*): "My formula for greatness in a human being is *amor fati*" (Nietzsche, 2005, p. 68). His concept of the *Übermensch* echoes Zeno's Stoic sage, transforming resigned acceptance into an affirmative will to power.

William James (1842–1910), the Harvard pragmatist, incorporated Stoic resilience into the Varieties of Religious Experience (1902), describing "healthy-mindedness" as rational acceptance: "The stoical strength… is a real tonic" (James, 1982, p. 123). His radical empiricism parallels Chrysippus's theory of impressions (*phantasiai*), grounding ethics in lived experience and

cognitive interpretation.

Bertrand Russell (1872–1970), the Cambridge philosopher, endorsed Stoic composure in The Conquest of Happiness (1930): "The secret of happiness… is this: let your interests be as wide as possible" (Russell, 1996, p. 89). Amid the anxieties of the atomic age, Russell's cosmopolitan humanism revived the Stoic idea of the kosmopolis, echoing Posidonius's universalism.

In psychotherapy, Aaron T. Beck (1921–2021), the founder of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), explicitly acknowledged Epictetus as a foundational influence: "Men are disturbed not by things, but by the views which they take of them" (Beck, 1976, p. 10). CBT's method of cognitive restructuring thus embodies Stoic "reframing," treating emotional disturbance as the result of faulty judgments.

Albert Ellis (1913–2007), founder of Rational Emotive Behavior Therapy (REBT), further integrated Stoicism into modern psychotherapy. In Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy (1962), he asserted: "Irrational beliefs… are the primary cause of emotional disturbance" (Ellis, 2004, p. 45). His ABC model—Activating Event, Belief, Consequence—mirrors the Stoic dichotomy of control, highlighting that belief, not circumstance, shapes emotion.

Lawrence C. Becker (1939-2018) advanced a comprehensive reconstruction of Stoic ethics in A New Stoicism (1997), proposing "universal perfectibility through reason" as the modern articulation of Stoic virtue (Becker, 2017, p. 3). Massimo Pigliucci (b. 1964) popularized Stoicism as a practical philosophy through How to Be a Stoic (2017), combining ancient spiritual exercises with secular mindfulness and scientific rationalism.

This modern Western revival of Stoicism as a "way of life" finds a powerful and parallel contemporary expression within the Islamic world. Several modern Muslim thinkers—while not explicitly identifying as Stoics—have drawn upon and integrated Stoic principles of resilience, self-mastery, and moral autonomy into their frameworks for Islamic revival and spiritual renewal. Together, they represent a distinct lineage of "Modern Islamic Stoicism," uniting ancient rational discipline with contemporary Islamic ethics.

Table 3. Practical Techniques: From Stoic Exercises to Islamic Spiritual Disciplines

Stoic Practice	Islamic Equivalent	Common Therapeutic Goal
Premeditatio Malorum (Premeditation of Evils)	***Dhikr al-Mawt*** (Remembrance of Death) and ***Al-Rida bil-Qada'*** (Contentment with Divine Decree)	To reduce attachment to worldly matters and develop resilience by mentally preparing for and accepting life's inevitable hardships.
Discipline of Assent (Withholding judgment on impressions)	***Muhasabah al-Nafs*** (Self-examination) and ***Husn al-Zann*** (Cultivating positive assumptions)	To achieve inner peace by critically examining one's thoughts, rejecting negative impulses, and reframing perceptions.
View from Above (Contemplating the cosmos to gain perspective)	***Tafakkur fi al-Khalq*** (Reflection on God's Creation)	To diminish the ego and worldly anxieties by contemplating the vastness of the universe and one's place within a divine order.
Practice of Adversity (Voluntary discomfort, e.g., fasting)	***Sawm*** (Fasting) and **Sabr** (Patient Perseverance through trials)	To strengthen willpower, build endurance, and cultivate gratitude by voluntarily enduring and patiently accepting hardship.

Modern Islamic Stoics

Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938), the poet-philosopher from British India and often hailed the "spiritual father of Pakistan," integrated Stoic resilience and self-mastery into his modern reconstruction of Islamic thought. In the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam (1930), Iqbal echoes Epictetus' dichotomy of control by emphasizing human agency (*ikhtiyar*) within the framework of divine *qadar*, urging Muslims to cultivate inner fortitude amid the moral and political crises of colonial subjugation. His concept of the "perfect man" (*insan kamil*) parallels Stoic virtue ethics, blending Sufi dynamism with rational self-discipline as the foundation for spiritual and civilizational renewal (Iqbal, 2013).

Ali Shariati (1933–1977), the Iranian sociologist and revolutionary thinker, fused Stoic endurance (*karteria*) with Shi□a notions of redemptive

suffering and martyrdom in works such as Religion vs. Religion (1970s). He interpreted *sabr* (patient perseverance) not as resignation but as active moral resistance to injustice, closely resembling Epictetus' ideal of the inner citadel as defiance against external tyranny. Influenced by existentialism and Hellenistic ethics through his exposure to French intellectual circles, Shariati reformulated Stoic self-mastery into a paradigm of spiritual autonomy and social activism, which profoundly shaped the ideological ethos of the 1979 Iranian Revolution (Shariati, 1993).

Hamza Yusuf (b. 1958), the American Muslim scholar and co-founder of Zaytuna College, explicitly engages Stoic principles in his lectures and writings, particularly in Purification of the Heart (2004). He draws analogies between *tawakkul* (trust in God) and *amor fati* (love of fate), adapting Epictetus' discipline of assent to the Islamic spiritual praxis (*riyadah*) of the heart. Yusuf's approach addresses modern mental health and spiritual allenation, promoting a Stoic-Islamic synthesis of resilience and moral serenity as an antidote to secular anxiety and emotional disorder (Yusuf, 2004; Robertson, 2019).

Modern Stoicism, revitalized by A. A. Long's Problems in Stoicism (1971), continues to thrive as a practical philosophy for the modern world, countering disillusionment through rational *eudaimonia*–the cultivation of human flourishing through virtue (Urmson, 1988, p. 201). The tradition's adaptability is reflected in its enduring lineage: from Anselm's contemplative faith to Pigliucci's popular podcasts, Stoicism remains a perennial *ars vitae*—an art of living. As Ilsetraut Hadot (b. 1928) observed, "Philosophy is a way of life," continually renewed in response to the human condition (Hadot, 1995, p. 83). Peter Sloterdijk (b. 1947) likewise interprets Stoicism as a foundational "psychopolitics,"—a philosophical art of self-management essential for enduring the turbulence of modern existence. In his Spheres trilogy and You Must Change Your Life, Sloterdijk argues that Stoicism pioneered the ethic of disciplined self-training, offering existential shelter and moral orientation in a disenchanted world.

Conclusion

This study has demonstrated that Epictetus' practical philosophy—centered on the dichotomy of control, the discipline of assent, and the inviolability of moral purpose—was neither alien to nor marginal within the Islamic intellectual tradition. Through direct reception during the formative period (al-Kindi, al-Razi, Miskawayh) and creative convergence in later centuries (al-Ghazali, Ibn

Tufayl, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, Shah Waliullah), Muslim thinkers consistently integrated or independently replicated Stoic therapeutic principles, reframing them within the Qur'anic concepts of *ikhtiyar*, *tawakkul*, *sabr*, and *rida bil-qada'*. The synthesis represents not a superficial similarity but a deep structural and functional isomorphism: both traditions locate genuine human freedom and psychological resilience in the rational governance of the self, while entrusting external outcomes to divine providence.

The historical evidence confirms the central hypothesis: that Epictetus' ethics was consciously appropriated where Greek-Arabic translations provided access and independently rediscovered wherever revelation and reason converged on similar truths. Rather than compromising *tawhid*, this convergence enriched Islamic moral psychology by supplying precise cognitive tools to distinguish responsible agency from fatalistic passivity—tools that remain fully consistent with the prophetic imperative to combine maximum effort with ultimate trust in God (*tawakkul*).

In the contemporary Muslim world—and particularly in Indonesia, where over 19 million individuals currently experience anxiety and depressive disorders amid rapid socio-economic change—this pre-modern Epictetan-Islamic synthesis offers a powerful, authentic resource. It provides a theologically grounded alternative to both secular Stoicism and overly passive interpretations of *qadar*, enabling believers to cultivate active resilience without falling into either self-reliant arrogance or paralyzing helplessness.

The findings therefore possess both scholarly and practical significance. Academically, they fill a substantial gap in comparative Islamic philosophy by documenting the reception and adaptation of Epictetus across thirteen centuries of Muslim thought. Practically, they offer Islamic mental-health professionals, educators, and religious counselors a historically validated framework that may be confidently applied in da'wa, psychotherapy, and community development programs.

Future research could usefully extend this analysis in three directions. *First,* empirical evaluation of Epictetan-Islamic cognitive interventions within clinical and counselling settings for Muslim populations. *Second,* exploration of similar receptions within other schools of Islamic thought—particularly the Mu□tazilite, Illuminationist, and modern reformist traditions. *Third,* comparative investigation of Stoic-inflected ethics within contemporary Sufi practices and Islamic self-help literature.

Ultimately, the enduring relevance of Epictetus within the Islamic

tradition affirms that genuine philosophical wisdom—when harmonious with revelation—transcends cultural and historical boundaries. By reclaiming this shared intellectual heritage, contemporary Muslims may confront the psychological and ethical challenges of modernity with resources that are at once deeply traditional and profoundly universal.

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