THE DESIGN ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE: Ayatullâh Ja'far Subḥânî's Criticism of David Hume's Thoughts

Mukhammad Zamzami, *Ghorbanali Karimzadeh Gharamaleki,** *Abdullah Hosseinieskandian,** & Fikri Mahzumi*

*Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel Surabaya, Indonesia
**Tabriz University, East Azerbaijan, Iran
Email: m.zamzami@uinsby.ac.id

Abstract

The design argument is one of the strongest arguments to prove God's existence. It has been analyzed by various thinkers throughout the history in defense of God's existence. However, some empiricist philosophers who do not believe in God's existence criticized and questioned this argument. David Hume (1711-1776) is one of those who made a tremendous effort to deny God's existence. He also criticized the design argument. Hume's critiques have always been challenged by philosophers and God-believing theologians. This article is made to criticize Hume's critiques on the design argument from Ayatullâh Subḥânî's perspective using descriptive-analytical method. Hume's objection was due to misunderstanding of the argument's purpose and function. It should be acknowledged that this argument can easily prove God's essence along with other arguments such as ḥudûth, necessity, and possibility. The design argument pushes us to the supernatural limits. Also, this argument is supported by experimental sciences because every new discovery made in natural sciences provides us with a new sign to prove God.

Argumen desain adalah salah satu argumen terkuat untuk membuktikan keberadaan Tuhan. Argumen dianalisis oleh berbagai pemikir sepanjang

sejarah untuk mempertahankan keberadaan Tuhan. Namun, beberapa filsuf empiris yang tidak percaya keberadaan Tuhan mengkritik dan mempertanyakannya. David Hume (1711-1776) adalah salah satu orang yang melakukan upaya luar biasa untuk menyangkal keberadaan Tuhan. Ia juga mengkritik argumen desain. Kritiknya selalu ditantang para filsuf dan teolog beriman. Artikel ini dilakukan untuk mengkritik Hume pada argumen desain dari perspektif Ayatullâh Subḥânî dengan metode deskriptif-analitik. Keberatan Hume muncul dari pemahaman salah tentang tujuan dan fungsi desain argumen. Harus diakui bahwa argumen ini dengan mudah membuktikan esensi Tuhan dengan bantuan argumen lain seperti ḥudûth, keniscayaan, dan kemungkinan. Argumen desain mendorong kita ke batas supernatural. Argumen ini juga didukung oleh ilmu-ilmu eksperimental karena setiap penemuan baru yang dibuat dalam ilmu alam memberi kita tanda baru untuk membuktikan Tuhan.

Introduction

The design argument is one of the most famous arguments in attempt to prove God's existence, which has attracted the attention of most philosophers. Along with the arguments of causality and existence, it forms the general framework of other arguments. In this argument, it is said that natural phenomena show such a precise structure, function, or internal relationship which led many to believe that there is a creative designer behind them and this design comes from Him. For this reason, philosophers have tried to make this general intuition in the form of an argument with a logical structure.

The set of these arguments is called the design argument. The design argument briefly says that if we look at our surroundings, we will inevitably find how everything is compatible and appropriate with its function, and everything proves that it was designed with expediency. In this way, those who believe in this argument conclude that this issue proves the existence of God. However, this argument has always faced critiques from some atheists and empiricist philosophers. In the West, the eighteenth-century

English philosopher David Hume challenged this argument (Lingier 2021, 233-248). Since then, many Westerners have believed this argument has been invalidated.

In the article "Hume's Objection to the Design Argument Based on the Existence of Evil and Skeptical Theism," written by Saemi and Hedayatzadeh Razavi (2019), one of Hume's criticisms of the design argument based on the problem of evil is discussed. In the article "Reflection on the Design Argument," written by Mohsen Musivand (2014), the critiques of the design argument have been explained and investigated. In the article "The Argument from Design According to the Contemporary Islamic Thinkers," written by Purrusta (2010), the explanations of Shahid Motahari, Javadi Amoli, and Ayatullâh Subḥânî about the design argument are stated.

So far, there is no research examines and condemns Hume's critiques based on the thoughts of Ayatullâh Subḥânî, and this research tries to answer: what explanation did Ayatullâh Subḥânî give about the design argument? What are the features and functions of design argument? What critiques did Hume make on the design argument? What are the criticisms of Hume's critiques from Ayatullâh Subḥânî's point of view? What is the main cause of Hume's error in the incorrect explanation of the design argument?

Biographies of Ayatullâh Jafar Subḥânî and David Hume

Grand Ayatullâh Ja'far Subḥânî is an Iranian Twelver Shia *marja'*, respected theologian, as well as an author. He was born in Tabriz on April 9, 1929. Subḥânî, the founder of the Imam Sadiq Institute in Qom, was formerly a member of the Association of Seminary Teachers of Qom. In the Islamic Seminary, Ja'far Subḥânî studied Arabic literature and Islamic legal principles. He enrolled at the Islamic Seminary in Qom in 1946. He took part in the Fiqh, Uṣûl al-Fiqh, Tafsir, and philosophy classes taught by prominent professors at the Islamic Seminary Subḥânî's important teachers were Seyyed Hossein Borujerdi, Imam Khomeini, and Mirza Sayyed Mohammad Tabatabai for nearly 15 years.

On November 29, 2006, Ja'far Subḥânî published his treatise (*al-Risâla*) on the death of Aqa Sheikh Javad Tabrizi at the request of a group of Azerbaijanis. He has seven categories for his Arabic and Persian books: Fiqh, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence, Tafsir, *'Ilm al-Kalâm*, Philosophy,

History of Islam, and Biographical Evaluation. In 2001, *Doctrines of Shii Islam: A Compendium of Imami Beliefs and Practices* book was translated into English and published by I.B. Tauris (Faghfoory 2003). His most well-known works are about *'Ilm al-Kalâm*. He has trained many students over the years, the most notable of whom are Mohammad Ali Khazâeli, Mohammad Baqer Fazeli, and Ali Sâfaei Haerî.

Meanwhile, David Hume was born in Edinburg on April 26, 1771, and died on August 25, 1776. He was a Scottish Philosopher, Historian, Economist, and Essayist known primarily for his philosophical empiricism and skepticism. His philosophical works included *A Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-40), *An Enquiring Concerning the Principles of Moral* (1751), *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1758), *Political Discourse* (1752), *History of England* (1754), and *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* (1758). In those works, Hume criticized the design arguments.

Philo, a fictional religious skeptic, criticized Hume's position on the issue. He contends that, unlike with produced products, the design argument is based on a fallacious parallel. His argument is that we have not yet seen the design of the universe, so we cannot say whether it was created intentionally. The analogy is problematic due to the size of the universe and the possibility of chaos in areas of the universe other than where we experience order. Hume also suggests that nature may be the only source of order in the world. If there is an orderly principle in nature, there is no need for a designer. He contends that even if the universe is in fact constructed, it is illogical to draw the inference that the designer must be an all-powerful, all-knowing, and kind deity. He further emphasized that the creation of the universe does not imply that there is only one God (Temple 1992, 19-30). This article examines Hume's critique of Subḥânî's narrative using the idea of Hume's skepticism as its foundation.

Design Argument in Ayatullâh Subḥânî's Perspective

Ayatullâh Subḥânî has discussed the design argument in his book *Ilâhiyât* and *Mafâhim al-Qur'ân fi Ma'âlim al-Tawḥîd* and some other works. In the book *Ilâhiyât*, he considered the design argument as one of the arguments for God's existence and stated four interpretations of it. However, in the book of *Mafâhim al-Qur'ân fi Ma'âlim al-Tawḥîd*, he mentioned the design argument as the fifth argument in proving the existence of God.

From Subḥânî's point of view, one of the clearest and at the same time the most universal arguments for the world's belonging to "transcendent matter" is the design argument, which God-believing thinkers have used since the past. It has been emphasized in the Quran and the hadiths of religious leaders, and even Imam Ja'far al-Ṣâdiq relies more on this argument in his letter to Mufaḍ ibn 'Umar (Subḥânî 2003, 72). From Subḥânî's point of view, the design argument is one of the best arguments in proving the existence of Almighty God, and for this reason, he mentions this argument as one of the most accurate arguments in proving the existence of God (Subḥânî 1999, 70).

Regarding the examples of design, he states, "The world of nature is subject to a specific system and everything in existence is not separated from the design and laws that natural sciences have discovered some of them, and as science advances, it takes more steps in understanding existence and the laws that apply to it". He also describes the meaning of the design, "Design is a type of harmonious relationship between the parts of a set, to achieve a specific goal, and the parts must complement each other" (Subḥânî 1989, 73). He considers design among the components of a collection necessary to achieve the desired goal of that collection. The design of the phenomena of the natural world is to achieve a specific goal that God has determined for it (Subḥânî 1992, 48).

This argument is based on a sensory premise and a rational premise. The explanation of the first premise is the responsibility of natural sciences and knowledge, while the judge of the second premise is reason and wisdom.

The first introduction to the design argument is that objective observations and scientific investigations report the purposeful design of natural beings, the clearest manifestations of design are seen in animals, plants, and especially in humans. In fact, each science field serves to check the quality of these collections, which, with special coordination, pursue special goals, of which we give clear examples.

The first example is the eye's structures, from the pupil to its different membranes and various waters, and the optic nerves and muscles that complete eye movements, are gathered with a certain quality and quantity, and they have such harmony with each other that they realize a certain goal called vision; if this cooperation and harmony did not exist, the desired goal would not be achieved.

The second example, when a baby is born, milk appears in the mother's breast. The appearance of breast-milk is the result of the cells and tissues, secretion of hormones and blood in the mother's body, and no one doubts this. The point here is that these tissues and hormones with this quality and quantity are placed together in the form of a chain link and have joined hands to produce milk from the mother's breast at the same time as the baby is born, thus, the baby can survive only with mother's milk. The intensity and amount of secretion is completely suitable for the child's alimentary tract. The study of this phenomenon indicates the goal orientation in the creation of women and babies.

The last example is related to reproduction. Whether in the human or animal world or in the vegetable world, whether in the male or female gender, they are a clear proof of purposefulness. That is the preservation of the generation, and we are satisfied with these three examples among many examples, because the natural sciences have correctly proven this issue, and these materials are available to everyone (Subḥânî 1989, 74-75).

The second premise of this argument is that the logical relationship of design is due to the involvement of a wise individual. Reason and wisdom clearly understand that there is a kind of logical relationship between design i.e., the involvement of reason or harmony, consciousness, as well as purposefulness. It is unwise for the first part of each of these three equations to appear without the second one because reason says that the structure of each of these phenomena indicates a type of calculation and measurement that has made the different components of phenomena quantitatively proportionate. He, furthermore, has established cooperation and harmony among them to finally achieve the goal. Such work can never be considered as the result of any kind of unconscious agent because the calculation and measurement that forms the basis of design is the product of knowledge and consciousness and only comes from a knowledgeable and capable agent and not from an unconscious agent (Subḥânî 1989, 75-76). In other words, reason considers three elements in every regular phenomenon: planning, organization, and purposefulness.

As far as scientific endeavors and sensory observations of nature are concerned, these three elements are obvious. On the other hand, objectifying each of these three elements requires calculation and measurement in terms of quantity and quality and a correct and coherent vision. So, if one of these things is incorrectly done, the design will be

disrupted, the nature of such an operation is not separable from science and consciousness, and such an operation can never be expressed through the unconscious agent, which is the exact opposite of this work (Subḥânî 1989, 76). In other words, reason dictates that the existence of design among phenomena is due to the proper structure and arrangement between them, and all this is to achieve a specific goal for which it has been determined. Therefore, by observing the design of the phenomena, we can realize the existence of structure, arrangement and purpose among them (Subḥânî 2008, 33).

Therefore, there is a rational relationship between the design of the phenomenon and the involvement of consciousness in it. The intellect discovers such a relationship and connection by studying the nature and action of the phenomenon and strongly rejects any kind of theory presented against it.

The Design Argument Characteristics According to Ayatullâh Subḥânî

Ayatullâh Subḥânî considers the design argument as one of the strongest arguments in proving the existence of God. Four important features have been assigned to it.

First, the design argument benefits from the support of common sense and revelation, unlike some arguments that only rely on one of these two. It is one of the few arguments that has such a feature. The design argument puts reason and revelation together and is proof for both believers in the divine religion and unbelievers (Subḥânî 2005, 156). Some verses in the Quran refer to this argument, such as Q.S. Fuṣṣilat [41]: 53,

> *"We will show them Our signs on [all] the horizons as well as within themselves until it becomes clear to them that it is the Truth. Does your Lord not suffice as a Witness for everything?"*

in Q.S. Yûnus [10]: 101,

> *"Say: Behold all that is in the heavens and on earth; but neither Signs nor Warners profit those who believe not."*

and Q.S. al-Baqarah [2]: 164,

> *"Indeed, in the creation of the heavens and the earth, and the alternation of the night and the day, and the [great] ships which sail through the sea with that which benefits people, and what Allah has*

sent down from the heavens of rain, giving life thereby to the earth after its lifelessness and dispersing therein every [kind of] moving creature, and [His] directing of the winds and the clouds controlled between the heaven and earth are signs for a people who use reason."

The design argument is also mentioned in the hadiths, narrated by Imam 'Alî ibn Abî Ṭâlib,

"Don't they look at God's small creations and see how the creation strengthened it? And established the composition of its organs and created ears and eyes for it and created suitable bones and skin for it. Look at the ant and the smallness of its body, how the tenderness of its creation cannot be understood by human eyes and thoughts. See how it walks the earth and struggles to earn its living. It transfers the seeds to its nest and keeps them in a special place. In the summer season, it strives for winter and when it goes in, does not forget to come out" ('Abduh 1987, 85).

Second, the design argument has a sensory base and other bases which are clear that every common sense can clearly understand it. In other words, design argument is a general argument for the entire human race, and for all who benefit from a healthy nature and reason, that it is a proof of God's existence. In order to convince those saying the opposite, the design argument uses the findings of experimental sciences in addition to theological and philosophical principles, and the first premise of this argument is based on empirical sciences (Tarrant 2018, 91-108). The findings of experimental science have always been a reason for denying the existence of God by atheists, but here it is exactly the opposite. In this argument, every new finding of experimental science that shows design in the world is a proof of God's existence, thus, adds to the certainty of this argument (Subḥânî 1999, 67).

Third, the design argument does not require the proof of design in the whole world, but it is enough to discover a precise system in every corner. Even though the rest is unknown to every person, it is enough to draw a conclusion. Whenever we step into a large library and pick up a book that summarizes an important scientific or literary topic during its chapters, we are sure that this work was the result of a powerful brain and not the result of irregular circulation and the randomness of an illiterate person; although we have not read the rest of the books.

Forth, the design argument is completely dynamic, and it keeps pace with the evolution of science and its new discoveries, and it continuously provides us with new signs to prove that the world belongs to a supernatural origin (Subḥânî 1989, 78). In other words, each discovery of new sciences that show the existence of creation design in the world is a proof of the mastery of the design argument and the proof of God's existence.

The Design Argument Applications According to Ayatullâh Subḥânî

According to Ayatullâh Subḥânî, Islamic theologians have used the design argument in two places: *first*, the design of the natural world implies the involvement of reason and consciousness in its creation, and this design can never be interpreted through the unconscious agent. The questions, who is the wise and powerful agent? Is *wâjib al-wujûd* or *mumkin al-wujûd* perishable or indestructible? This argument can never definitively answer this question, and it proves only some parts of the claim. In other words, this argument proves that the creation of this world is not due to chance and randomness, but it is a planned and purposeful thing that was done by a wise and forward-thinking person.

Design argument removes any futility from the world creation and gives it meaning in order to reach a certain goal. The role of this argument in giving hope and motivation to man to achieve the goal that has been specified for his creation as one of the components of the world of creation is undeniable (Subḥânî 2005, 90). *Second*, when it is proved through the argument of necessity and possibility, and other rational arguments, leading to what is *Wâjib al-Wujûd*, it became clear that the design that governs nature is His work. At this time, the design argument can be used to prove God's perfect attributes, such as knowledge, power, wisdom, life, and sagacity.

From this point of view, we can see that Nâṣir al-Dîn Ṭûsî used the design argument in the second case, not in the first case; that is, he first proved by the argument of necessity and possibility of *Wâjib al-Wujûd*. Then, in proving the attributes of His perfection, he took the mastery and design that governs the world of nature as proof of His Knowledge and Power.

In any case, humans should not neglect the application of this argument, which clearly proves the involvement of reason and intelligence

in the creation of this design. The aforementioned result is enough to invalidate the opinion of the materialists and this is one of God's lofty goals (Subḥânî 1989, 78-79). From the point of view of Ayatullâh Subḥânî, the design argument is a purely intellectual argument. After studying the nature of design in natural beings, a person judges that these extremely complex and precise devices, which from their sum, the goal, the end, and the harmony of the parts with each other, is not possible without the intervention of a Wise mind and Designer (Subḥânî 1991, 19).

David Hume's Critiques on the Design Argument

First, the design argument is based on simile and allegory (Sober 2018). That is, the phenomena of the world are likened to human artifacts such as houses and cars. When we see a house, we immediately judge the existence of a Wise, Powerful and Prudent Creator. By observing the design in the world phenomena, we realize the existence of a Wise, Powerful and Wise Creator (Grave 1976, 64-78; Temple 1992, 19-30). However, this analogy can be disputed because if we see the house and realize the existence of its maker, it is because we have already experienced it. If we see a house, we conclude with the greatest certainty that it had an architect or builder because it is precisely the ordinary kind that we have experienced. On the contrary, we will certainly not admit that the world is similar to a house with the same certainty infer a similar cause. This dissimilarity is so clear that what can be claimed is only a hypothetical guess about a similar cause.

According to Hume, we do not have such an experience about the world's phenomena because since we have opened our eyes to this world, we have observed the world with a special design. We have never experienced its emergence by a Wise Creator, so we consider the current world and the design that governs it based on past experiences, as the artifact of a Wise Creator (Popkin & Stroll 1993, 212; De Dijn 2012, 3-21).

Ayatullâh Subḥânî has stated in his criticisms of Hume's first critique that the design argument is not an empirical argument in the sense that the criterion for generalizing the ruling is based on the complete similarity between experienced and unexperienced objects. Rather, it is an intellectual argument that the intellect, after observing the design governing the world of nature and thinking about it, decides that this

world is the creation of a knowledgeable and capable being without the need for similes and the like. Also, the sensory nature of one of the two introductions of this argument does not harm its rationality, because the role of sense in this argument is only limited to proving the subject, i.e., proving the design of the universe, but its result is within the limits of reason and is based on rational calculations. This is similar to proving through the sense of the existence of a square that reason immediately decides that its four sides are equal. Therefore, the reason sees a clear connection between design and its three principles, i.e., coherence, harmony, and purposefulness, and between the role of intelligence and intellect. For example, when the system considers the visual system, it means the presence of components that are different in terms of quantity and quality and are arranged in such a way that cooperation and influence between them are possible. From this design, a specific purpose has emerged, the reason decides that the vision system is a creation of a great creator, because the creation of such a system requires the involvement of intelligence and reason as well as the existence of an obvious purpose (Subḥânî 2005, 30-31).

If the allegory method is used in explaining the design argument and examples are given from human artifacts, it is not because they want to base simile and allegory on the design argument. It is rather to remind them of the examples of rational and self-evident rulings (Golpaygani 2004, 50).

It is a mistake for Hume to think that the design argument is empirical in nature like other arguments. Empirical evidence is in cases where we want to discover the relationship between a tangible phenomenon with another phenomenon. In other words, the empirical argument can only be valid for discovering the relationship between two components of nature, not for discovering the relationship between nature and the supernatural. In other words, experience is effective when we want to discover the cause of a phenomenon by experiment. For example, we understand the relationship between heat and water vaporization or the relationship between cold water and its freezing. So, the condition for an empirical relationship is that both sides are perceptible and under the control of our sensory observation.

It is correct to say in the design argument, as human artifacts need a designer and organizer, the support of this similarity is not just an allegory

until Hume's critiques are included. However, the real support of these cases is the correlation between cause and effect; that is, a specific effect must come from a specific cause. We say that human effects are examples of regular effects, and according to the rule of causality, regular effects must be issued from a wise cause. The same rule of causality is also valid for nature and its phenomena, so human artifacts and natural creatures are two examples of the law of causality, and similes are not the basis of their similarity to cause critiques. Of course, as an empiricist, Hume does not accept rational rules in the way that rationalists accept, and this is a basic issue that should be discussed. Therefore, the authors conclude that the defenders of the design argument do not use allegory.

Second, it may be accepted that by the design argument, it is possible to prove the God's rule of the world. Yet, we will never be able to prove the existence of the creator that is introduced in the heavenly religions (*samawi religion*). It means God does not have any defects in terms of the attributes of beauty and glory. From a specific effect, we can only deduce the cause that creates that effect. Therefore, we can never go from a limited and finite world to an unlimited and infinite creator (Hick 1993, 64).

Every argument has a special mission and the mission of this argument is no other than to refute the view of the materialists and prove that the world is created by a designer and has emerged based on a conscious and wise plan (Subḥânî 2005, 33). If we could prove the existence of Almighty God and His Attributes with just one argument, it would not be necessary to provide different arguments in this regard. Each argument has its own function and the design argument has a specific scope and purpose for discussion. The design argument starts from the objective findings in the natural world and from the design among those phenomena, and it reaches the proof of the existence of God, and it cannot be an all-round explanation and full-fledged defense of all monotheistic beliefs (Subḥânî 2008, 85).

Hume's mistake here is that those who believe that God is absolute perfection have reached this conclusion by relying on the design argument, which according to Hume is an empirical argument. However, the value of this argument is only to the extent that it leads us to the supernatural border. This argument proves that it has a transcendental nature and is under the dominion of that transcendence. That transcendence depends on its essence and action. Whether this transcendence is obligatory or

possible, accidental or ancient, single or many, limited or unlimited, and whether its knowledge and power are finite or infinite, are beyond the scope of this argument. These are issues that are solely the responsibility of divine philosophy, and divine philosophy proves these with other arguments.

Third, the perfection of the knowledge and wisdom of this world creator cannot be understood from the design and sophistication of the natural world, because the current design may have existed after many trials and errors of its creator. If we see a ship, at first we judge its builder's intelligence and prominence, but after we know that he adapted his design from others and that plan has also been tested after centuries, it will reduce our admiration for the shipbuilder (Popkin & Stroll 1993, 217)

This critique, like the previous one, is caused by a misunderstanding of the design argument mission. Suppose we accept that the design argument indicates the dependence of the natural world on the supernatural world. In that case, it testifies to the involvement of science and free will in the creation of natural design, and we have confirmed the correctness of the design argument (Subḥânî 2005, 33). In fact, one of the major problems of atheists in explaining their baseless theories is that they equate the supernatural world with the material world (Maftukhin & Khamami 2018, 300-301). The truth is that these two worlds are different and their conditions, characteristics and creation cannot be considered the same. If they were alike, there would be no need to explain multiple universes. This is while the science of Physics itself talks about the existence of multiple worlds, and this statement of empiricist philosophers is invalidated by their own sciences (Subḥânî 1999, 549-551).

This critique is due to the fact that Hume is unaware of the limits of the design argument application. He thought that all theological issues are deduced from one argument, and that argument is a design argument. This argument proves that nature is not overlooked by itself, and that the capability of nature are conquered. As Philosophers call it, nature is "subject to conquest." In other words, it has a transcendental nature, and that transcendental nature is the ruler of nature. The design argument is expressive and sufficient within the limits of this application. Then, the existence of afterlife–whether its perfection is inherent or acquired, is it gradually acquired or as old as its essence, and the like– is a series of issues that can be proven with other arguments and does not reduce the value of

the design argument. The purpose of this argument is to guide us from nature to the boundary beyond nature. Beyond this limit, it is out of the responsibility of this argument (Motahhari 2008, 549-551).

The task of the design argument is to prove that the ruler of this world has knowledge and power, as this is the only thing that the design argument can prove. It is different to the issue of how the designer of the world achieve the power; it is another thing that should be discussed separately from the design argument.

Fourth, the basis of the design argument is that the similarity of effects proves the similarity of causes. Since human effects indicate knowing and selective agents, natural effects, which are similar to human effects in terms of design, indicate a subject or agents similar to human agents. The result of this argument is the proof of creation for the world like human subjects. Now, if someone considers God to be adorned with all kinds of similitudes, he cannot accept the result of the design argument. Therefore, the design argument will not be rational and universal (Popkin & Stroll 1993, 217-218).

In response to this critique, the authors state that, *first*, this argument is not based on allegory and experience; *second*, equating two things to each other does not indicate the all-round similarity of both. The common feature of what are compared is the criterion and measure, for example, comparing a human being to a lion is in the characteristic of courage, and not in the other characteristics of the lion.

Therefore, if it is argued that the world needs an all-knowing, powerful, and free creation through the analogy of natural effects to human effects, then what is intended is only the characteristic of knowledge and free will, not other human characteristics and features. Even the amount and level of discretion and knowledge are not intended, only the principle is. In this case, the design argument does not have any contradictions with the principle of the creation of the world creator from similarity (Subḥânî 2005, 31).

Hume says that this argument is a kind of "simile" in terms of its nature. He also says, it is meant to prove the perfect similarity between the creation of nature and the creation of man, which is wrong. It is impossible that the works of the creator of nature and human are completely similar, yet the Creator of nature is free from being similar to human in terms of His nature and attributes, thus, also dissimilar in terms of His actions and

work. Human is a part of nature, so he is in the process of "becoming" and evolving, and all his efforts are to bring himself from power to action and from imperfection to perfection (Boudry & Leuridan 2011, 558-578; Lingier 2021, 233-248; Arshadnejad 2016). All human efforts are a kind of movement from senses to action and from imperfection to perfection. Note that human is a part of nature's components and not the creator of nature. His position within the nature is in the form of establishing an artificial relationship among nature's components. Human constructions, such as cities, ships, and houses, are a series of natural materials that are purposefully created with an artificial connection; it is the purpose of the maker and builder, not the purpose of artificial. By this means, the manufacturer wants to achieve an artificial and non-transverse connection to the goal, which is connected to each other (Malekian 1993, 134)

In brief, the foundation of human creation is two things: *first*, the connection of the total components is artificial, not natural; *second*, God intervenes with the creation world in order to bring himself from ability to action and removes defects from the system of the world. This is why we call the world system as "the best system of creation" (Motahhari 1978, 58).

None of these two pillars exists in God's creation; the relationship between the components of the artifact should be natural and the purpose of the object may be the purpose of the creator. On the other hand, the connection of the artificial parts should be natural, as we see in the connection of the parts of the solar system or animals and humans.

The truth is that Hume's and Western philosophers' idea of the design argument is a common idea. It is based on the fact that they assumed God to be a maker, like human makers, and discussed the maker in such a way, while we never have not proved God with such thought.

A review of Hume's theory about the design argument once again clarifies the weakness of the philosophical foundation of the West, both in divine and material terms. It also shows that Westerners do not have an iota of philosophical form about the design argument. What is reviewed in Islamic philosophy in the discussion of "grace" does not exist in Western philosophy. The Westerners' idea of the design argument is at the level of the common people's idea, not at the level of Islamic scholars and philosophers (Motahhari 1978, 58).

Fifth, the natural world is more like a ship or a house or other human artifacts than a living being such as an animal or a plant. Therefore,

instead of assuming an external cause and origin for the world, we can consider its cause and origin to be internal, just like the origin of animal and plant life. In this case, the design argument will not prove the existence of supernatural existence (Subḥânî 2005, 31-32).

Hume acknowledged that the universe has other components that are very similar to the structure of the universe. These components are animals and plants. It is obvious that the universe is more like an animal or a plant than a clock or a loom. Therefore, its cause is most likely similar to the first cause, so we can infer that the cause of the universe is something similar to animal reproduction or plant growth and development (Popkin & Stroll 1993, 218). In rejecting this critique, Subḥânî expresses,

> "The characteristic of each material, assuming the truth of this statement, the ultimate role it can play is to bring the material to a certain stage of a certain evolution and a certain system, but it cannot plan for its future and make preparations for temporary needs. Or, between that substance and other objects and elements that have different systems and properties, to create such a strange and surprising coherence and proportion. In this regard, we refer to one out of thousands of examples in this world. We assume that the inherent property of the human sperm is that when it settles in the woman's womb. It moves towards the embryonic form and eventually turns into a human being with regular organs. But in this world, calculations and plans have been prepared for the future of man and his future needs, which cannot be based on the property of matter. For example, before the sperm is present in the mother's womb, compounds and developments occur in the woman's body that corresponds to the child's life and development. Can we consider all these calculations and plans to be properties of human sperm? What do these two have to do with each other?" (Subḥânî 2005, 32).

On the other hand, where is it known that the origin of humans and animals is within themselves? Does this mean that something from their own era caused them to come into existence? All these statements are nothing but a series of groundless and irrational data, and reason does not

accept that existence itself is the source of existence for it. Can an animal or a plant create exactly like itself? Even humans do not have this ability.

Sixth, in the natural world, events that harm other creatures occur. These events are the natural disaster, such as earthquakes and hurricanes. Despite such anomalous phenomena, how can the design of the world be considered as the result of a healthy and benevolent mind? (Subḥânî 2005, 31). Ayatullâh Subḥânî in rejecting this critique says,

> "Natural events such as earthquakes and storms, which are called evil, have a special system in the universe and are caused by certain causes and are governed by special calculations and equations that humans have succeeded in discovering some of these factors and some of them have not yet been discovered. However, whether or not the design argument is compatible with human interests has nothing to do with the design argument, which seeks to prove the origin and subject of knowledge, power, and will for the world of nature" Subḥânî 2005, 31).

Criticizing the design argument based on the evil problems is incorrect because what is considered in the design argument is that the action has a purpose, coordination, and coherence, and whether it leads to good or evil is not discussed. The design itself leading to evil also has specific divine purposes outside this articles subject. It is believed that the one who criticizes the design argument from the evil side, did not pay attention to the scope of the design argument and what is expected from it (Amoli 1985, 253-254). Popkin and Stroll in their book say,

> "When someone studies nature with all its unpleasant attributes, that is, storms and earthquakes and the conflicts of one part of nature with another, can he/she conclude that projection comes from a good common sense?" (Popkin & Stroll 1993, 224).

Also, the Islamic philosophers, in response to the critique of evil in relation to the *aḥsan* (good) and *akmal* (perfect) system, investigated the existing and possible hypothetical types in terms of good and evil. By referring to God's providence and wisdom, they have concluded that only two types of it can be realized, one is purely good and the other is abundantly and dominantly good (Motahhari 1985, 78). However, it is

impossible to fulfill other assumptions, which include: equal good and evil, abundant and dominant evil, and pure evil (Tabatabai 2003, 231).

Conclusion

The meaning of design in the design argument is purposeful design. This type of design is due to the existence of planning in creating a special relationship between the components and members of the collection to reach a specific goal. The existence of purpose and end is a necessary condition for the design discussed in this argument. Certainly, this type of design is the central argument in the design argument. This argument has been presented in various ways. Still, the common structure of this argument is expressed as, "Orderliness exists; the universe is in order, and every order has a regulator, so, the world has a regulator." Also, the effectiveness of the design argument can be explained with a rational analysis in such a way that it indicates the ultimate effectiveness of creatures. At this time, since the ultimate subject is also the active cause, and the active cause proves the objectivity of the ultimate subject, then the design argument proves not only the divine attributes but also His essence.

In explaining the design argument, Subḥânî has sometimes considered the goal, and sometimes only the accuracy of relationships and laws without paying special attention to the goal issue. Subḥânî considers the laws discovered by empirical science as examples of design, which means that only consistent relations are enough to be considered orderly, and there is no purpose. In one interpretation of the design argument, he used the overall coherence in the world as a minor, but it is so clear that empirical science cannot prove such a thing with rational analysis before proving the existence of God and minor, thus, the argument is incomplete. From Subḥânî's point of view, most of Hume's critiques of the design argument are due to a misunderstanding of the function and purpose of this argument. This, along with other discussions of God's existence can be a sufficient argument of God's perfect attributes.

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