EPISTEMOLOGY OF *ḤUḌÛRÎ* IN SUHRAWARDÎ AL-MAQTÛL'S *ḤIKMAT ISHRÂQIYAH*

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Abstract

The epistemological thinking of ḥuḍûrî in Ḥikmat al-Ishrâqiyah Suhrawardî has provided a new direction for the development of Islamic knowledge. In the ontological perspective, the idea of illumination provides an understanding that there is an extensive range of realities, stretching indefinitely, which ultimately leads to the understanding of essentialism. Suhrawardî's success in bringing forth this illuminative thinking entails his profound mastery of philosophy and Sufism, as well as his high intelligence in formulating Islamic thought. The only solution to the problem of developing knowledge according to Suhrawardî, lies in the reality of ḥuḍûrî (knowledge with presence), in which there are many dialogues about 'subjects who know' or 'I am performative'. In this concept, oneself knows itself through the science of ḥuḍûrî (knowledge with presence), which is existentially identical to the form of 'oneself' itself.

Pemikiran epistemologis ḥuḍûrî di Ḥikmat al-Ishrâqiyah Suhrawardî telah memberikan arah baru bagi pengembangan pengetahuan Islam. Dalam perspektif ontologis, gagasan iluminasi memberikan pemahaman bahwa ada berbagai realitas yang sangat luas, yang membentang tak terbatas, yang akhirnya mengarah pada pemahaman esensialisme. Keberhasilan Suhrawardî dalam mewujudkan pemikiran iluminasi ini berkat penguasaan filsafat dan tasawufnya, serta kecerdasannya yang tinggi dalam merumuskan pemikiran Islam. Satu-satunya solusi untuk masalah

pengembangan pengetahuan menurut Suhrawardî, terletak pada realitas ḥuḍûrî (pengetahuan dengan kehadiran), di mana ada banyak dialog tentang 'subyek yang tahu' atau 'saya performatif'. Dalam konsep ini, diri sendiri tahu dirinya melalui ilmu ḥuḍûrî (pengetahuan dengan kehadiran), yang secara eksistensial identik dengan bentuk 'diri sendiri'.

Introduction

Generally, Sufism has only been known as a means of bringing people closer to God through various forms of spiritual experience, such as repentance, remembrance, sincerity, *zuhud* (ascetic, hermits), and others. In this case, Sufism is only positioned as a medium to seek serenity, tranquility, and true happiness of people in the midst of an uncertain direction of worldly life. This assumption is not wrong but less precise or less comprehensive in seeing a particular object. There is another important aspect of Sufism, which is the basic foundation in every charity to achieve happiness in the world and the hereafter, for every seeker of truth and self-perfection and life.

This vital aspect is Sufism as one of the main pillars in the Islamic epistemology. The epistemology with sufistic nuance becomes very significant to be revealed as a discourse in gaining knowledge with the '*dhawq*' (sense, feel) intuition approach which is "*irfânî*' (gnosis). Sufism believes that to find epistemological truths needs God guidance. This epistemology presents in the Sufism discourse which is an attempt to answer the epistemological truth by forming an epistemological-paradigmatic structure with spiritual nuances with an awareness of holistic and complete thinking in understanding human beings, the universe, and God.

Sufism is only a metaphorical symbol for a concept of asceticism and '*irfân* (gnosis). The term '*irfân* (gnosis) as the term '*ma'rifah*' comes from the same root word in Arabic which literally means science. '*Irfân* is a certain form of knowledge obtained not through sensory perception, empirical experience, or ratio approach, but spiritual witnessing and

personal disclosure, then the fact is generalized into a proposition that can explain the meaning of witnessing and disclosure, among others, through rational argumentation (Ruslani 2000, ix). It is theoretical *'irfân* as in the philosophy of illumination (*ishrâq*). Meanwhile, if the witnessing and disclosure achieved through certain spiritual practices (*riyâḍah*) and the behavior of certain spiritual journeys (*shayr wa suluk*), then it is known as *"irfân 'amalî'*. Both were witnessing and disclosure will later form the structure of achieving *ma'rifah*, in this case *al-'ilm al-ḥuḍûrî* (knowledge with presence).

Islamic philosophy is a science that is still debated by experts regarding understanding and scope. However, the writer in this article tends to argue that the Islamic philosophy does exist and is proven to exist until now. In the world of philosophy, there are two major streams, namely peripatetic and illumination (Supriyadi 2009, 178). Understanding and knowing these two streams is fundamental when we want to study philosophy because all philosophers, especially Muslims, ultimately refer to and relate to these two streams. The peripatetic stream is a stream that is generally followed by most philosophers, while illumination stream is a counterpart to peripatetic stream. The stream of illumination was pioneered by a Muslim philosopher named Suhrawardî al-Maqtûl, also known as the father of illumination.

Suhrawardî is famous in the study of Islamic philosophy because of his enormous contribution in sparking the stream of illumination as a counterpart to peripatetic stream in philosophy although previous western philosophers still influenced him. It is undeniable because some or even the whole building of Islamic philosophy is said to be a continuation of western philosophy that is Greek philosophy. Suhrawardî's thinking in the most prominent philosophy was his attempt to create a bond between Sufism and philosophy. He was also closely related to the thoughts of previous philosophers, such as Abû Yazîd al-Busṭâmî and al-Ḥallâj, who, if recruited upward inherited the teachings of Hermes, are Phitagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Neo Platonism, Zoroastrians, and ancient Egyptian philosophers. This fact indirectly indicates the figure and thought in philosophy.

In the field of metaphysics, Suhrawardî was the first person in history to affirm the differences in two metaphysical features, namely general metaphysics and particular metaphysics. One of the temporal and structural characteristics of *ishrâqiyyah* philosophy in the field of

metaphysics that stands out is concerning existence and essence (*mahiyah*). Suhrawardî's philosophy is a turning point in the history of Islamic philosophy as an earnest effort to bring mysticism closer to rational philosophy. The methodology he built reconciled discursive reasoning and intellectual intuition which later became the foundation of Islamic philosophy.

Ishrâqiyah thinking (illuminative) was ontologically and epistemologically born as an alternative to the weaknesses in the previous science, especially peripatetic philosophy. According to Suhrawardî, the peripatetic philosophical thinking has many drawbacks, including in epistemological scope, because it cannot reach all realities of existence (Aminravazi 1992, 72). Even rational syllogism itself, at a particular time, cannot explain or define something known. Meanwhile, in the ontological aspect, Suhrawardî made much criticism, especially about existence-essence. For him, the fundamentals of realities are the essence, not existence as peripatetic philosophy. Essence is primary, while existence is only ascender and is the nature of essence and only in mind (Mahzar 2000, xv; Nasr 1986, 85). This article briefly describes the epistemology of Suhrawardî's light-metaphysics in explaining the relationship with the science of ḥuḍûrî (*al-'ilm al-ḥuḍûrî/*knowledge with presence).

Suhrawardî between his Thought and Death: A Portrait of Biography

Historically, there is little we can know about the facts of Suhrawardî al-Maqtûl's life. In the historical record, only a certain amount of momentum mentioned about his life. Suhrawardî al-Maqtûl was born in a small village called Suhrawardî in Northeast Iran in 549 H/1155 AD. He was born with the name Shihâb al-Dîn Yaḥyâ ibn Amîrak Abû al-Futûḥ Suhrawardî, but is better known as Suhrawardî "al-Maqtûl" died because he was hanged in Allepo in 1191 AD (Ziai 2003, 544). His tragic death because the order of Ṣalâḥ al-Dîn al-Ayyûbî executed him. The title "al-Maqtûl" is a distinctive form with two other sufis who have the same name, namely Abû al-Najîb al-Suhrawardî who died in 563 AH and Abû Hafah Shihâb al-Dîn al-Suhrawardî al-Baghdâdî who died in 632 AH, the author of the book *Awârif al-Ma'ârif* (Musthofa 1999, 247).

Since childhood Shihâb al-Dîn has shown his seriousness in pursuing the field of knowledge. It can be seen from the various scientific fields he studied, such as studying philosophy and Islamic theology with Majd al-Dîn al-Jillî, the teacher of Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî in Marâgha, who was

his first teacher. He completed his studies to al-Jillî in the early twenties. After completing his studies with Majd al-Dîn al-Jillî, he continued his intellectual adventure to the city of Isfahân or Mardin, the center of civilization and intellectuals at that time. In this city, he studied philosophy with Fakhr al-Dîn al-Mardânî (Ziai 2003, 22), and he was the most important teacher for Suhrawardî. He completed studying with al-Mardânî in the mid-twenties. Al-Mardânî, a contemporary with an anti-Aristotelian, Abû Barakât al-Baghdâdî (d. after 560/1164), was one of the philosophers who was often named by Suhrawardî. They both have the same view that the certainty of intuition is as authentic as the certainty of sense and sensory perception, and only the final certainty that peripatetic philosophy receives (Ziai 2003, 23). In addition to studying with Fakhr al-Dîn al-Mardânî, another Suhrawardî's teacher was Ẓâhir al-Farsî, to whom he learned logic from the book *al-Baṣâ'ir al-Naṣîriyyah fi Ilm al-Manṭiq*, by the famous logician 'Umar ibn Sahlân al-Sâwî (d. 540/1145). 'Umar ibn Sahlân al-Sâwî is one of the names of philosophers who are often mentioned by Suhrawardî in his various works of thought. During Isfahân (the name of a city in Iran) Shihâb al-Dîn Suhrawardî al-Maqtûl had many associations with the sufis, who gave a pattern of thinking.

After feeling satisfied learning in Isfahân, he then continued his journey to Ḥalb city and studied with al-Shâfir Iftikhâr al-Dîn. Young Suhrawardî arrived in Allepo or Syria in 579/1183 in the midst of a heated political turmoil and intrigue. In this city, Suhrawardî's name began to rise and was famous for his knowledge. Moreover, he was a good friend of the crown prince, Mâlik Ẓâhir Shah, the son of Ṣalâḥ al-Dîn al-Ayyûbî. It made *fuqahâ'* (expert of Islamic law) jealous of him and began to spread slander, intrigue, and threats to him. With this in mind, the ruler of Ḥalb, Mâlik Ẓâhir Shah called him and held a meeting attended by theologians and *fuqahâ'*. At the meeting, he expressed his strong ideas and arguments which showed his intelligence. On this basis, Mâlik Ẓâhir Shah finally gave an excellent speech to him.

With his fame and popularity, his haters increasingly made it a tool to accumulate malice. Besides, his closeness to Mâlik Ẓâhir Shah became the media of the provocations of his haters because this endangered the thoughts of the crown prince, then it was reported to Ṣalâḥ al-Dîn al-Ayyûbî. There was an excessive fear from their haters: if Mâlik Ẓâhir Shah is close to Suhrawardî, it will make his *'aqîdah* heretical. Hearing these incitements, Ṣalâḥ al-Dîn al-Ayyûbî was then affected and ordered his son,

Mâlik Ẓâhir Shah to execute Suhrawardî immediately. By listening to the considerations of *fuqahâ'*, Mâlik decided to punish him. This tragic event occurred in 578 AH in Ḥalb, meaning that he died at the age of 38 (*qamariah*), and 36 years in *shamsiyah*. Another literature states that Suhrawardî's death was due to the intervention of Sulṭân Ṣalâḥ al-Dîn al-Ayyûbî who put him in prison in 1911 till his death. Another version mentions that Suhrawardî died because of strangulation, or another history mentions that his death was because of hunger (Hadi 2002, 214).

The study of Suhrawardî's thoughts is not only limited to the discourse on the philosophy of illumination contained in his work of *al-Ishrâq a sich*, but there are a lot of his other works used as a basis for thinking about Islamic philosophy in the future. Even some orientalists said that Suhrawardî was an essential figure in building the thinking of Islamic philosophy after Ibn Sînâ. For example, there is the writing of Carra de Vaux entitled *"La Philosophie Ilmuninative d'sspras Suhrawerdi Meqtul,"* Max Horten with his essay entitled *"Die Philosophie der Erleutung nach Suhrawardî,"* and Louis Massignon with *"Recuil de Tectes Inedict."* Even some figures such as Otto Spies edited and translated his works. There was also Helmut Ritter who discussed aspects of his life and distinguished it from the three other Muslim mystics who have the same name. There was also Henry Corbin who gave special attention to Suhrawardî's works and called him an "illumination philosophy teacher" (Shaykh al-Ishrâq). Today, Sayyed Hossein Nasr seriously examined Suhrawardî's thoughts, especially in his spiritual and religious dimensions. It was an effort to examine the foundations of logic and philosophical epistemology of illumination from a philosophical point of view.

Although his age is relatively short, Suhrawardî al-Maqtûl's works and legacy of scientific thought has been the subject of study among philosophers and sufism observers. During his life, he wrote a lot which principally could be mapped into three parts. First is the master book of philosophy which consists of four main parts, namely *al-Talwîḥât* (Notice), *al-Muqawwamât* (The Right), *al-Mashârî' wa al-Mutâraḥât* (Road and aegis), and *al-Ḥikmat al-Ishrâq* (Enlightenment Philosophy). The work of *al-Ḥikmat al-Ishrâq* which became the magnum opus principally underlies the building of his illusory (illusive) philosophy, namely: (a) in this book, Suhrawardî al-Maqtûl reviews various reasons in the preparation of *ḥikmat al-ishrâq*; (b) in addition to the main argument for the preparation of the philosophy of

illumination, this book also contains the methodology of *ḥikmat al-ishrâq* which consists of four main parts: (1) self-activities such as seclusion, stopping eating meat, and preparing to receive inspiration from God. In this position, philosophers with the power of creative imagination or intuition can feel the presence of "the light of God" and the process of "self-attitude" (Musthofa 1999, 247). (2) After passing the first phase, the next stage is the stage of God entering human form. (3) The presence of God entering this human form carries a theoretical-philosophical consequence where this stage is the period of building an actual science. Moreover, the last stage, (4) can be called codification where the philosopher enters the writing stage or arranges the theoretical framework as the primary reference for the building of his philosophy of illumination. The third part, in addition to reviewing the arguments and methodology of the philosophy of illumination, this work also contains the things that underlie the philosophy of illumination building, namely Suhrawardî al-Maqtûl's view on the history of philosophy.

Second, the works of Suhrawardî al-Maqtûl are in the form of articles or brief treatises on illumination both written in Arabic and Persian, such as: *al-Hayâkil al-Nûr* (Holy House of Light), *al-Alwâḥ al-'Imâdiyyah* (Sheets of Imadiyah), *Partaw-Namah* (Description of Tajjalî), and *al-Bustân al-Qulûb* (Garden of the Heart). Third, Suhrawardî al-Maqtûl's works in the form of parables or metaphors. They include: *al-Qiṣṣah al-Gharbiyyah* (Acts of Exile to the West), *al-Risâlat al-Ṭâ'ir* (Treatise on Birds) — a book that extends to philosophical work and thought of Ibn Sînâ contained in the book of *al-Ishârah wa al-Tanbîhât—Awz-i par-i Jibrail* (Sound of the Wings of Gabriel), *'Aql-i-Surkh* (Red Intellect), *Ruzi ba Jama'ati Sufiyan* (A day with the Sufis), *Fî al-Ḥaqîqat al-Ishrâq* (The Nature of Divine Love) —a book that deals a lot about Ibn Sînâ's maghribiyah philosophy, *Fî al-Hallah al-Ṭulufuliyyah*, *al-Lughah al-Muran*, and *Safir-i Simurgh* (Merry Tears of Pingai Birds), works about stories that have literary value (Ziai 1999, 22).

Metaphysics of Light: Definition and Sources of *Ishrâqî*

The term *ishrâq* (illumination) has many meanings, including rising, shining, radiant, and bright because it is illuminated ('Abd al-Ḥulw 1988, 109). Meanwhile, in the language of philosophy, illumination means the source of contemplation and changes in the shape of the emotional life to achieve action and harmony (Echols and Shadily 1979, 311). In Islamic

thought, that wisdom is not only a theory believed but also a spiritual movement practically from the realm of darkness in which knowledge and happiness are impossible because of the akali light in which knowledge and happiness achieved together. Therefore, according to Islamic thought that the source of knowledge is illumination in the form of *hads* that relate to the substance of light (Fakhry 2002, 131). Light is a symbol and the main character of *ishrâqi* (emanation) philosophy. Light symbolism is used to determine a factor that determines existence, form, and matter, rational things that are primary and scender, intellect, soul, matter, individuals, and levels of intensity of mystical experience (Aminravazi 1999, 321).

Meanwhile, the sources of knowledge that form Suhrawardî's *ishrâqi* epistemology include (Nasr 1986, 74): *First*, previous Sufism thoughts, such as Abû Manṣûr al-Ḥallâj (858-913 AD) and al-Ghazâlî (1058-1111 AD), as contained in the Book of *Mishkat al-Anwâr*, in which there is an explanation of the relationship between *nûr* (light) and faith. *Second*, Islamic peripatetic philosophical thinking, especially the peripatetic philosophy of Ibn Sînâ. Suhrawardî places this philosophy as an essential principle in understanding *ishrâqi* beliefs. *Third*, the building of philosophical thinking before Islam, especially the stream of Pythagoras, Platonism, and Hermes as it grew in Alexandria, which was then spread by the *Syabiah Harran* (star worshippers). *Fourth*, the tradition of ancient Persian thought where Suhrawardî tried to evoke a new perspective on the tradition of thought inherited from generation to generation in an ancient environment of wisdom. *Fifth*, relying on Zoroastrian teachings in using symbols of light and darkness, especially in the spiritual sciences which Suhrawardî added a lot of his terms (Bagus 1996, 1188).

Therefore, Suhrawardî's building of thought relies on a variety of diverse sources, which are not only from Islam but also from non-Islam, all of which lead to philosophy and Sufism. In this case, Suhrawardî did not erase the thoughts that had developed before; instead he did creative synthesis by placing himself as a unifying between *Ḥikmat Ladûniyyah* (genius) and *Ḥikmat al-'Atîqah* (antiquity). For Suhrawardî, total and universal wisdom is a clear lesson in the various kinds of ancient Hindus, ancient Persians, Babylonians, Egyptians, and Greeks until Aristotle's time (Nasr 1986, 75). Suhrawardî also claimed to be a meeting place for the two world wisdom, namely the wisdom revealed to Prophet Idrîs (Hermes) as the founder of philosophy and the sciences (*al-wâlid al-ḥukamâ*), then

divided into two parts. One part was in Egypt which then moved to Greece, and another was in Persia. Then, the two lessons came together and formed Islamic civilization (Nasr 1986, 76).

The core of illumination philosophy is the nature and spread of light. Sufi figures mentioned God as Light based on Q.S. al-Nûr [24]: 35. When Ibn Sînâ asked about the meaning of the verse, he replied that light contained essential and metaphorical meanings (Al-Walid 2018). Essentially, light means the perfection of clarity because the light in itself is indeed bright. Meanwhile, the metaphorical meaning must be understood in two meanings, namely light as something that is good or as a cause that leads to good (Nasution 1999, 146). Al-Ghazâlî developed an understanding of the meaning of light in his book *Mishkat al-Anwâr* in which he says that *al-Nûr* is just Allah called *Nûr 'alâ Nûr*, while Suhrawardî calls it *Nûr 'alâ Nûr* (light from lights) (al-Ghazali 1995, 15). The light that Suhrawardî refers to is immaterial and cannot be defined because something that is bright does not require definition, and light is the brightest entity in the world.

Meanwhile, what is not light (darkness) is not something special that comes from an independent source. Everything that is not of pure light consists of something that does not require a substratum which is a dark substance. As far as it can accept both light and darkness, it can be called *'ismus-ismus'*. Every *ismus* is dark, whatever light it has must come from outside sources (Fakhry 1970, 332).

This dark substance has properties that originate from inherent darkness in dark substances, whereas pure light is free from darkness. The relationship between light and dark is not a different relationship, but the relationship between existence and non-existence, affirming light which undoubtedly accepts its negation as reality, namely darkness to light so that it becomes itself (Nasution 1999, 147).

Original light illumination consists of two: *First*, abstract light (for example intellect, either universal or individual). It is not formed and never becomes an attribute of something other than itself (substance). Abstract light knows itself through itself and does not require a non-ego to express its existence to itself. The essence of abstract light is recognized as the elimination of light. *Second*, atributte (accident light) which is a distant reflection of abstract light which is caused by its distance or loss of characteristics of its parent substance. The series of lights must lead to the first or undoubted light because there cannot be an unlimited backward motion. This undoubted light, by Suhrawardî, is referred to as the light of

all lights, independent light, holy light, and others. The first characteristic of the light of all lights is the one that gives rise to an emanation process which is different from the source in its level of perfection (Nasution 1999, 148).

According to Suhrawardî al-Maqtûl, the first light is the closest light (*al-nûr al-aqrab*) which comes from the light of all lights, and here the first light is obtained (*yaḥṣul*). This first light has several primary characters: (1) there is an abstract light. (2) the first light has a double movement meaning that it loves (*yuḥibbu*) and sees (*yushhidu*) the light of all lights above it, and controls it (*yaqharu*) as well as gives enlightenment or light (*ashraqa*) what is beneath it. (3) The first light has a backrest in which the backrest imprints a substance called 'barzakh' which has a condition (state, *hay'ah*). The substance and condition together act as a container for light. (4) The first light also has quality or nature that it is rich (*ghani*) concerning lower light, and also reduced with the light of all lights (Soleh 2004, 119; Soleh 2011, 11).

Furthermore, Suhrawardî explained that when the first light appears, it has a direct effect on the light of all lights without duration or 'moment.' The light of all lights at that time will also illuminate and also 'turn on' the substance and conditions connected with the first light (Abdullah 1995, 215). The light which is in the first abstract light is 'light that shines' (*al-nûr al-sanih*) which receives all light. It is the first process which then goes on to the next process of receiving two lights. One of them comes from the light of all lights directly, and the other comes from the first light. The first light has received it from the light of all lights and directly goes because it is translucent (Shafwan 2002, 103). The same thing happens where the third abstract light receives four lights. One of them comes directly from the light of all lights; one is from the first light, and the other two come from the second light. This process continues where the fourth abstract light receives eight lights; the fifth abstract light receives sixteen lights and so on. In connection with this multiple lights, the essence of each light is self-awareness, and part of it is 'controlling lights' (*al-anwâr al-qâhirah*), and some others are the regulating lights (*al-anwâr al-mudabbirah*) (Shafwan 2002, 104).

Suhrawardî al-Maqtûl's Epistemology of Ishrâqî: Gradation of Essence

It is challenging to identify Suhrawardî's epistemological system with a particular paradigm (empiricism, rationalism, and others). Suhrawardî asserted that in the end, one could gain confidence only through knowledge realized through illumination. He does not throw away the possibility of obtaining partial knowledge through other methods of cognition. Suhrawardî's epistemology primarily consists of three elements: definition, sense perception, and original ideas (Aminravazi 1999, 320). Knowledge of definition has specific characteristics because it must include not only the essence of something concerned, as indicated by Aristotle, but all of its characteristics and accidents for all practicality are impossible. For Suhrawardî, the boundaries and definitions in the way presented by peripatetic people can never be obtained: "All inevitable definitions lead to a priori concepts which do not necessarily need to be defined; if this is not the case, then there will be unlimited replacement" (Aminravazi 1999, 320).

Meanwhile, sense perception is far more critical. According to Suhrawardî, senses will be able to distinguish between simple entities and merged entities. Knowledge with these sense perceptions also has the same weaknesses as the definition, but Suhrawardî does not throw away the knowledge, "Nothing is more real than what can be felt ... because all our knowledge comes from the senses; therefore, everything that comes from the senses is innate and cannot be defined" (Aminravazi 1999, 321).

Knowledge of innate ideas provides an essential link between knowledge and definition and sense perception. The concept of Suhrawardî's philosophical epistemology still uses the model of cognition for discourse in specific domains, so that the rationalistic context of Suhrawardî's theory of knowledge is essential. His philosophical epistemology must be seen as an introductory part of his illuminative epistemology.

The basic thinking of *Ishrâqiyyah* is about gradation of essence, i.e. a theory of cognition that emphasizes the existence of self-awareness to achieve equality and unity between mind and reality (Rahman 1979, 124). This theory is related to the concept of knowledge. According to Suhrawardî, existence is only in mind, general ideas, and concepts of scender that do not exist in reality, whereas the real reality is essences which are forms of light (Mahzar 2000, xv). These lights are real because their absence means darkness and is not recognized. For Suhrawardî, each of these lights differs in the level of intensity of appearance and also depends

very much on the degree of proximity to the light of all lights (*Nûr al-Anwâr*), i.e. the source of all the most perfect lights existing (Nasr 1986, 89).

In this case, Suhrawardî criticized Aristotle's logic where the definition, according to him, must consist of genus plus differensia. According to Suhrawardî, specific attributes of something that is defined cannot be predicated on other things, resulting in not knowing about it. For example, when we define horses with their whinny, then people who have no idea about horses will not understand at all about the horses (Nasution 1999, 154).

According to Suhrawardî, reason without intuition and illumination is childish and will not be able to reach the transcendent source of all truth and reasoning, while intuition without preparation of logic and training as well as the development of rational abilities can be lost and will not be able to express itself in a concise and methodical manner. To be able to understand the bright intellectual side of transcendental philosophy fully, someone must understand the philosophy of Aristotle, logic, mathematics, and Sufism. Sense that is without help of *dhawq* cannot be trusted because *dhawq* functions to absorb all essence and discard skepticism. The real speculative side of spiritual experiences needs to be formulated and systematized by logical thinking. The ultimate goal of all science is illumination and *ma'rifat* (gnosis) (Nasution 1999, 155).

According to Suhrawardî, the illumination combines two processes at once which makes Suhrawardî's thinking different from the others. The first process is the emanation of each light under *Nûr al-Anwâr*. The second is the process of dual illumination and vision. Therefore, according to Suhrawardî, knowledge is generated by the awareness of feelings experienced directly, then he is free from logical dualism, truth, and error, not as a form of subject and object relations as we have known (Ziai 1998, 49).

Regarding what is seen by *Ahl al-Bidâyah* (beginners), the first flash that illuminates the souls of seekers from the Divine presence is unexpected events, and the light illuminates the wanderer's soul of the Divine world, and this is very pleasing. Enlightenment is when suddenly a dazzling light comes, then disappears, and it is He who shows the lightning. If he passes this stage, he will become in such a way that he no longer sees himself, and there is no knowledge of his existence (*fana-i-akbar*), and if one forgets

himself and also forgets his forgetfulness, it is said to be mortal from a mortal.

In the *ishrâqiyah* tradition, there are several things in gaining knowledge: *First*, purification of the soul and preparation for *mukhâshafah* (disclosure) by carrying out various spiritual experiences, such as ascetic and sufistic attitudes so that the intuitive power in humans is as part of the 'Light of God' (*al-Barîq al-Ilâh*). One can accept the reality of its existence and acknowledge its intuitive truth through inspiration and self-disclosure (*mushâhadah wa mukhâshafah*). *Second*, the acceptance stage where light enters a human's self which will take shape as a series of disclosure light (*al-Anwâr al-Sânilah*) in which, through the disclosure lights, knowledge acting as real knowledge (*al-'ulûm al-ḥaqîqah*) can be obtained.

> "When you have made a careful observation in yourself, you will find that you are made of "you" which is nothing but what knows its reality. This 'your self' is what knows its reality (ana'iyyatuka). It is the way everyone recognizes himself and 'my self' every person who is the same as you" (Aminravazi 1999, 323).

The third is the building and development of valid knowledge (*al-imâlim al-ṣâliḥ*) using a discursive approach. *Fourth* is the descriptive stage of the various experiences gained through natural instincts so that acquiring Islamic knowledge does not only rely on natural power but also on the power of ratio, by combining both of them. Thus, this intuitive approach is used to achieve all knowledge that is not achieved by the power of ratio, so that the knowledge generated by this intuitive is the highest and most trusted knowledge. In this case, Suhrawardî, concerning *Ḥikmat al-Ishrâq*, revealed that:

> "Truth and content (ḥikmat al-israra), for me, have never been realized through learning but differently. Finally, after realizing their truths (through illumination), I then found their rational justification, but in a way that even I had to ignore (rational basis) the arguments shown, no skeptic was able to make me sink into doubt regarding the truth of these things ..." (Aminravazi 1999, 326)

Suhrawardî al-Maqtûl's Knowledge of *Ḥuḍûrî: al-Ḥuḍûrî al-Shay*

Suhrawardî's thinking is very different from peripatetic philosophy which emphasizes rational reasoning as a method of thinking and seeking the truth, while illumination philosophy tries to provide an essential place for natural methods (*'irfân*) as a companion, or even, as the basis for

rational reasoning. Suhrawardî tries to synthesize these two approaches, *burhânî* and *'irfânî* in a reliable and holistic system of thinking.

In illumination philosophy, Suhrawardî classified methods in finding truth into three groups. *First*, those who have profound mystical experiences — like the sufis — but cannot express their experiences discursively. *Second*, those who have discursive reasoning skills, but do not have mystical experiences that are very important to know the actual reality directly. Accordingly, it does not only rely on past authority, as can be found in peripatetic philosophers; and *thirdly*, those who not only have deep and authentic mystical experiences, but also have the ability of reasoning and discursive language, as happened to Plato in the past including Suhrawardî in his time (Ziai 1998, 121).

A mystical experience is a direct experience of seeing true reality because in such mystical experience the object of study is present in a person. This mode of recognition is often called *ḥuḍûrî* (knowledge with presence), then distinguished with *ḥuṣûlî* (acquired knowledge) where the object of study obtained indirectly through a representation, whether it is a symbol or concept (Leaman 2001, 80). A mystical experience, in this case, has an essential meaning for the search for truth. Through that experience, one (a philosopher or sufi) can directly witness the actual truth (*al-Ḥaqq*) which cannot be obtained carefully through any approaches, senses, or reason. Otherwise, their philosophy will be filled with expressions of *shaṭaḥat* that cannot be accessed.

Definitively, *ḥuḍûrî* (knowledge with presence) is a kind of knowledge that all of its relationships are within its frame so that the whole anatomy of the idea seen as true without any implications for external objective references that require exterior relations. The relationship of knowing in the form of knowledge is the relationship of the subject itself without the intervention of the connection with an external object. However, in presenting this idea, what is forced to be called real objects (in the external realm) have a no different ontology and existential status from personal objects (in the mind realm). It means that the type of object that we have called an essential object for the idea of knowledge like that, and is subjective and immanent in the mind of the knowing subject in *ḥuḍûrî*, is united with an actual object. Thus, real objects are no longer absent (always present) and accidental to the truth value of *ḥuḍûrî* science. In other words, in *ḥuḍûrî*, real objects and individual objects are no longer differentiated

and constitute an inseparable unity. Therefore, *ḥuḍûrî* consists of a simple understanding of objectivity which is directly present in the soul of the knowing subject and thus, it logically implied in the definition of the conception of knowledge itself.

On the other hand, the science of *ḥuṣûlî* (acquired knowledge) is a kind of knowledge that involves individual objects as well as actual objects separately, and which includes correspondence between one of these objects and others (Leaman 2001, 72). In reality, the combination of external and internal objects along with the maximum degree of correspondence between them forms the essence of this type of knowledge. Because correspondence is a two-party relationship essentially argued that if this relationship occurs, there must be a conjunction between one object, A, with another object, B. The relationship does not apply if one direction of conjunction is incorrect. If there were no external objects, there would be no illustration and representation. As a result, there is no possibility of the existence of a correspondence relationship between the two. Thus, there is no possibility for the existence of that kind of knowledge at all. As explained above, external objects play a significant and fundamental role in the essentiality of the science of *ḥuṣûlî* (knowledge with correspondence), but this does not become a forming part of the science of *ḥuḍûrî* (knowledge with presence).

Suhrawardî's view requires the subject to understand the whole object in order to know that this comes from the general proposition that knowledge of something lies in the relationship between the object and the subject that knows and so on. This knowledge requires the knowing subject to be in a position where the knowledge understands the object directly by connecting the viewpoint as an actual meeting between the visible subject and the visible object; a relationship between two things without any obstacle, and the relationship between the two. In the analysis of relationships, there is a compound unity that forms the whole nature of this relationship (Ziai 1998, 131). In its mental existence (in the mind realm), this unity is initially simple. However, contemplation and study of this unity can legitimately break its simplicity into three parts to analyze through contemplation of acts of knowing, knowing subjects, and known objects. The conceptual triad concerning the *ḥuḍûrî* idea derived from the contemplation of the primordial simplicity of the constructive mental existence of the immanent and essential acts of knowing itself, i.e. the type of action that is identical to the existence of the human mind itself. As for

the absolute unity between the act of knowledge and the mind of the person who knows, it is an absolute unity as it is the unity that becomes the commitment of Ibn Rushd's theory of happiness and the notion of transubstancy (Ziai 1998, 135).

Regarding 'knowledge of self' in the soul, Suhrawardî assumed that this was related to the validity of knowledge that is the knowledge of essences obtained through self-knowledge with oneself. It deals with identification made at the level of awareness. Awareness toward essence is identified as an important element of a rational soul because, in the *Ḥikmat al-Ishrâq*, something that is aware of one's essence is abstract light (*nûr mujarad*), as the light of the living things. Meanwhile, the rational soul with self-awareness activities identified is similar to abstract light which links the cosmic order with the physical order through the principle of direct awareness and various levels (Ziai 1998, 140). In the meantime, Mulla Ṣadrâ's idea, the most famous, is the existential unity between the knowing subject, known object, and knowledge (Nasution 1999, 168). There is no reason why we should not be able to analyze this pure and absolute unity into different conceptual parts without the conceptual complexity of destroying the unity of the unrestrained reality.

Self-knowledge is then realized in a particular form of perception, namely as a vision (*mushâhadah*) or light. It is the relationship between 'I' (*ana*, the subject matter) and essence through the path of existence (*huwa*, the object being objectified), both that is conscious of themselves and within themselves, and that realize what they are. The principle of *mushâhadah al-ishrâqiyyah* allows the subject to know something as it is, which is to know the essence. This illumination knowledge is based on the knowledge of presence of something (*al-ḥuḍûrî al-shay*) which is not a form of predictive knowledge, but only because of the relationship between subject and object - so that this knowledge referred to as *al-ilm al-ḥuḍûrî*. The knowing subject is related to the object, capturing the essence of an object because of its proof (its Evidenz) (Ziai 1998, 141).

In this case, the original structure of *ḥuḍûrî* science is singular, not double, and cannot be divided. The conceptual analysis divides it into three interconnected parts which are all characterized by its essential conditions, presence (*al-ḥuḍûr*), and mental. However, these three parts do not move further and turn into an external object. Even so, the analysis of *ḥuṣûlî* science does that. It takes an external object as the fourth item of its

essentiality. Therefore, ḥuḍûrî (knowledge with presence) is self-evident knowledge and has an object of self-objectivity.

Thus, one of the characteristics of ḥuḍûrî science and knowledge is its freedom from the dualism of truth and error (i.e., always following truth and reality). It is because the essence of this pattern of knowledge is not related to the idea of correspondence. When there are no external objects, the correspondence between internal and external conditions, and between external facts and statements/propositions are no longer valid. Thus, the principle of correspondence has been widely accepted as a criterion and benchmark of truth or a mistake of a statement about an external object, while the same principle accepted as a benchmark for examining truth or error in - according to Russell's statement - knowledge of the truth (Leaman 2001, 83). Such principles cannot be applied in the case of sience and knowledge of ḥuḍûrî.

Because the dualism of truth and error depends substantially on the correspondence relationship: first between the subjective-essential object (the object present in the mind) and the object-accidental object (external object), and the second between a statement' and 'objective reference, there will be no dualism applied as in ḥuḍûrî knowledge and science. If there is no correspondence, there is no meaning of the concept of ḥuṣûlî science (knowledge with correspondence); as well as statements about this knowledge, statements about a physical object, as well as truth or misrepresentation like that. Consequently, because it is free from correspondence, knowledge with presence is not vulnerable to the logical dualism of truth and error. Another characteristic of knowledge with the presence (ḥuḍûrî) is its freedom from the distinction between knowledge with conception (taṣawwur) and knowledge with confirmation (taṣdîq). Unlike knowledge with correspondence, knowledge with presence is not subject to differentiation from these two things.

Suhrawardî's idea of illumination knowledge and presence does not require conception and confirmation. It is not predictive knowledge and does not involve time processes. It takes place in a short time ('an) (Ziai 1998, 135). Epistemologically, not all knowledge restricted to conception - predictive justification, including knowledge with the presence (al-'ilm al-ḥuḍûrî) which can achieve formal knowledge (al-'ilm al-ṣûrî) by proving through knowledge of illumination itself when the relationship between subject and object is also achieved.

It is where lies the importance of the real image that connects our nature with the level of ideas and high abstraction so that we can achieve unity. The mystical experience gained is not so subjective and personal that the nature and manner of obtaining it can be explained to others, namely in the form of *ḥuḍûrî* knowledge which is the key in the thought of *Ḥikmat Ishrâqiyyah*. However, the reality of knowledge with presence does not involve the understanding of these two things, namely conception and confirmation. By denying the dualism of truth and errors in knowledge with presence, we do not mean that there is no understanding of truth that can be applied to that particular category of knowledge because there is another meaning of truth in the linguistics of Illumination philosophy that is relevant to our discussion which we can call "non-phenomenal" (Leaman 2001, 82). However, it is strictly equivalent to the idea of existence. In Suhrawardî's *Ḥikmat Ishrâqiyyah* system, if people say, for example, 'God is the truth' (*Nûr 'alâ Nûr*), he says that 'God exists' or 'God is a Compulsory Being' (*Wâjib al-Wujûd*). Also if we equate *ḥuḍûrî* science with a kind of "elixir" or "direct presence" of the reality of objects in mind, we are in a legitimate position to apply existential notions of such truth to the reality of *ḥuḍûrî*. However, here the point is that the logical dualism between truth and error and the logical distinction between concepts and beliefs cannot be applied to the realm of *ḥuḍûrî* knowledge and science, but it would be more appropriate to say that they are worthy of *ḥuṣûlî* (knowledge with correspondence).

Conclusion

Suhrawardî's thought of *Ḥikmat al-Ishrâqiyah* has provided a new direction for the development of Islamic knowledge. In other cases, the idea of illumination gives the understanding that there is an extensive range of realities, stretching indefinitely. The concept of the reality of light is the essence of existence because, despite the different levels of intensity and appearance, it eventually leads to the understanding of essentialism. Thus, Suhrawardî's success in bringing forth illuminative work was done because of his profound mastery of philosophy and Sufism and coupled with his high intelligence in formulating Islamic thought. The only solution to this dilemma, as suggested by Suhrawardî, lies in the reality of *ḥuḍûrî* (knowledge with presence) as long as it relates to subjects who know or in our terms 'I performative.' In this system of personal identity, oneself knows itself

through the science of *ḥuḍûrî* (knowledge with presence) which is existentially identical to the form of self itself. In this case, there is no need for representation and conception of self or representation of an object or perception of an action such as doubt, feeling, or knowledge of another. Then, a self with knowledge and awareness of his presence manifests his doubts about his thoughts and knowledge about others through correspondence.

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