CONSTRUCTING FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH DEMOCRATIC DISCOURSES: Insights from Indonesia and Türkiye

Hadza Min Fadhli Robby*
*Universitas Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta
Email: hadza.fadhli@ui.ac.id

Abstract
This research explores how Indonesia and Türkiye construct their foreign policies. This research uses Lene Hansen’s discourse analysis model to closely observe how critical events in global politics, especially after 9/11, influence foreign policymakers throughout the world, especially foreign policymakers in Indonesia and Türkiye. Even though Indonesia and Türkiye had positioned themselves in different positions throughout the Cold War, both countries tried to form new doctrines for their foreign policies as they democratize themselves. To examine this construction, this study will focus on analyzing discourse as one of the instruments used in shaping foreign policy. Using official speeches and statements as primary sources for the discourse analysis, this research shows that one of the discourses that were frequently emphasized in Indonesian and Turkish foreign policy during the 2000s is the discourse of ‘democracy’. From the perspective of Indonesian and Turkish foreign policymakers, the discourse of ‘democracy’ has been placed as one of the core discourses in the process of foreign policy formation of both countries. This discourse has also played a crucial role in determining the regional and global politics of both countries.

Keywords: democratic discourse; foreign policy; Indonesia; Türkiye.

Received: March 28, 2024; Revised: June 10, 2024 Accepted: June 19, 2024

Introduction

Scholars have argued that democracy will significantly impact the conduct and practices of foreign policies. Many research studies discuss the commitment of Western democracies to design their foreign policy according to the democratic principles and to ensure that their foreign policy conduct will always prioritize democratic values and introduce democratic norms. This could be seen in the examples of the United States, which consider itself as a main promoter for democracy in global politics (Rose 2000). A lively political process in the United States make foreign policy a highly engaging issue that involve wider public participation (Aldrich et al 2006). It is argued by Warren (2019) that
America’s involvement in promoting democracy will strengthen its democratic credential at home. This was not only limited in the case of the United States, but also in the foreign policy conduct of the European Union. Quite distinct from the American case, European activism in the promotion of democracy was not entirely driven by its democratic commitment (Rose 2000). Rather, this was driven by an effort to anticipate security risk coming from non-democratic countries in the neighboring region of Eastern Europe which was previously aligned with the Warsaw Bloc. In one case, Germany as one of the core members of the European Union sees its role as a ‘promoter of democracy’ as part of its projection of its vision as a ‘civilian power’ (Wolff 2013).

The case for democratic influence in the practices of foreign policy does not stop in the cases of Western countries. Many other non-Western countries are trying to situate the democratic values that they have adapted into their distinct socio-political circumstances. This was displayed in the example of Indian foreign policy, where a strengthened democratic mechanism has allowed India to take different approach in understanding its foreign policy vision (Chitalkar & Malone 2011). While promotion of democracy conducted by Western countries might not be working to modify India’s political behavior on certain aspect, India’s way of democracy has certainly provided India with flexibility to calibrate its foreign relations and geostrategic position in the region of Asia-Pacific and the World (Wagner 2009). The Brazilian and Turkish case have also shown the elite’s commitment to democracy helped the democratization to have enormous impact in the conduct of foreign policies of both countries (Santiso 2003; Uzgel 2003). As one of the democratizing nations, Indonesia is also referring to the democratic values whenever Indonesia tried to reposition itself in the regional and global politics (Anwar 2010a). Sukma (2011) argued that Indonesia even was ready to envision itself as regional leader by projecting its democratic vision to the region of Southeast Asia. This research will be capturing how emerging and democratizing nations like Indonesia and Türkiye project its democratic values and visions into its foreign policy practices and discourses.

Some of the research has been conducted on the issue of how Indonesia and Türkiye’s political outlook after its democratization process. The earliest research which was dedicated to compare the political developments of both countries was penned by Hadiz (2011). Hadiz looked
into the cases of Islamist political parties in Indonesia which were unable to emulate the AK Parti’s success story in Türkiye. One of the most cited research on this topic was written by Schneier (2015), which outlined the main differences between the practices of Muslim democracies in Indonesia and Türkiye. Akkoyunlu (2007) also discussed the progress of democratization process in Indonesia and Türkiye, by focusing on the topic of military reform and the dynamics of civil-military relations in both countries. In a recently-written article, van Bruinessen (2021) had also elaborated the relationship between traditionalist Muslim communities in Indonesia and Türkiye and how it influenced to the rise of populism in both countries. This research wishes to fill the existing gap by focusing specifically on the issue of how the narratives of democracy in Indonesia and Türkiye significantly influenced the official foreign policy discourses of both countries.

This current study will highlight the role of Indonesia and Türkiye, two emerging powers in international politics who share similar identities as Muslim, nominally democratic, and economically rising nations in promoting the idea of democracy and political advancement in the Muslim world and global politics. As both countries strengthen their credentials as democratic nations, they are trying to build up their foreign policy vision according to democratic outlook that they have gained after the process of democratization. Faced with a multitude of crises and conflicts at that time, Indonesia and Türkiye had no other choice but to show their newfound identities reflected in their foreign policy conduct as a way to contribute to addressing global issues. This research wishes to see how democratization affected the ways both countries are positioning themselves in regional and international politics, by particularly using the discourse of ‘democracy’ and clarifying their democratic identities to global audiences by telling their way of doing democracy. Through this way of thinking of ‘localizing democracy’, Indonesia and Türkiye aspire to build a new narrative on how democracy could be a ‘homegrown idea’ instead of an exported, Western-oriented one by highlighting the importance of combining universal democratic value and locally-rooted political norms.

Through a careful and thorough reading of foreign policy discourses expressed by leaders in Indonesia and Türkiye, it could be seen that both countries are focusing on the discourse of ‘democracy’ as a way to ensure their rising place in both regional and global politics. The usage of the
discourse of ‘democracy’ would therefore consequently reinforce the notion that both countries are Muslim democrats that can be potential emerging powers and also middle power in international politics. This research will also focus on a question on the relationship between the identity of both Indonesia and Türkiye as ‘Muslim democratic’ nations and their foreign policy positioning. To analyze this, this study will specify particularly on two separate cases of leadership in Indonesia and Türkiye, that is the leadership of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ahmet Davutoğlu, respectively. Thus, the research will focus on analysing Indonesian and Turkish foreign policy discourses from year 2002 to 2015. This momentum is crucial since both countries have crucial roles in responding to two key crises of global politics, that is 9/11 and the Arab Spring.

Research Method

This research will use Lene Hansen’s discourse analysis methodology to analyze foreign policy discursively. Hansen’s methodology is used considering that it would see beyond the discourse, and would enable the study to consider underlying relations between power, discourse and policy that are often disregarded in dominant foreign policy methodology which is mostly influenced by grand theory (i.e. realism and liberalism) and constructivist approach. Hence, using this methodology would contribute to shedding light on the democratic credentials often evoked by Indonesian and Turkish leadership in their official statements and speeches in foreign policy fora. Therefore, this research will be designed according to qualitative method, and especially engaging with discourse analysis by connecting discourses publicly articulated by high-ranking officials in Indonesia and Türkiye.

Hansen’s method will help to map discourses that are being addressed and to connect the relationship between the discourses addressed by employing four main elements of Hansen’s discourse analysis method (displayed in Figure 1): (a) the number of selves; (b) the intertextual model; (c) the temporal perspective; and (d) the number of events (Hansen 2006, 67-71). After a thorough survey of the existing materials on the topic, it is decided that this research will use the second element, namely the intertextual models.
The intertextual models are divided into at least four different choices (see Figure 1), depending on which discourse would be prioritized in the analysis and how exactly the actor/s’ identity would be reflected in the discourses being used throughout the practice. Of four choices, the researcher focuses on the first intertextual model that would focus on analyzing the official discourses through articulate readings of the official statements, academic papers, interviews, or press conferences conducted by foreign policy officials of both countries. The reason why the first intertextual model is chosen is because the other models (such as Model 2, Model 3A, and Model 3B) could not be easily deployed and applied in the case of Indonesia. The first intertextual model was chosen because this would suit the social-political contexts in Indonesia and Türkiye. Figure 2 describes how the research would be conducted.

Based on the initial screening of research materials and official documents which amounting to a total of 42 documents from the case of Indonesia and Türkiye, it could be seen that one of the most frequently used discourses is democracy. In Indonesia case, the discourse of democracy is repeated 516 times in the speeches, while the same discourse is repeated 319 times in the Türkiye case. These texts indicate that the discourse of democracy is linked to related discourses, such as human rights, security, and peace. This linkage was done by the policymakers to strengthen the democratic discourse. It would also be expected that countries who are pursuing their democratization agenda prioritize the
discourse of democracy over any other discourses. The countries who are using the discourse of democracy in their foreign policies would also be sharing their experiences of ‘doing democracy’ and thus would emphasize their version of ‘doing democracy’ as a success story of achieving ‘peace and stability’ which resulted from the continuing process of democratization.

While doing the analysis, it should be noted that the selection of the materials might not be per what Hansen has ascribed in her discourse analysis methodology. Hansen has stipulated that manuscripts that should be used are those that at least have three criteria: widely read, clear articulations, and strong formal authority. Since most of the texts used in this research could not fulfill all of these criteria, importance will be given to two criteria: strong authority and clear articulations. Many of the texts, especially in the Indonesian case, were not read widely due to the perception of foreign policy issues as an ‘elitist’ case. In this aspect, Hansen’s method could be applied more flexibly, but still conducted in line with Hansen’s methodological rule.

In the case of Indonesia, there are at least 27 speeches and 1 paper that would be used for analysis. The materials were taken from the open-access publication and official websites of the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Indonesian Ministry of State Secretariat. After the process of selecting and curating, materials that would be used for analysis are from speeches, statements, and articles made by three main figures in Indonesian foreign policy during the era of the 2000s. These three main...
figures are Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2004-2014), Hassan Wirajuda (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 2001-2009), and Marty Natalegawa (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 2009-2014). These figures were mainly responsible for charting the direction of Indonesian foreign policy, especially during the first and second terms of Yudhoyono’s presidency. Besides these figures, there is also a key name, Dino Patti Djalal (Special Staff, Foreign Policy Desk for the President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2004-2010), but the influence of the statement made by this figure was liminal. His role was largely limited to advisory capacity and writing speeches for the President Yudhoyono on issues related to foreign policy.

In the case of Türkiye, some 22 official speeches and press conferences, 2 papers, and 2 official interviews were selected from the database. Most of these documents were readily available on open-source websites and edited books. The documents were written by influential figures in Turkish foreign policy during the 2000s. These figures are Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Prime Minister of Türkiye, 2003-2014; President of Türkiye, 2014-now), Ahmet Davutoğlu (Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister of Türkiye, 2002-2009; Minister of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye, 2009-2014; Prime Minister of Türkiye, 2014-2016), and Abdullah Gül (Prime Minister of Türkiye, 2002-2003; Minister of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye, 2003-2007; President of Türkiye, 2007-2014). There was also involvement of some important figures within the closest circle of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, especially during the last years of Erdoğan’s premiership and the first period of his presidency. After 2012, it was known that Erdoğan also included İbrahim Kalin (Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister of Türkiye, 2009-2012; Deputy Undersecretary of the Prime Minister of Türkiye, 2012-2014; Spokesperson of the Presidency of Türkiye, 2014-2023) and Hakan Fidan (Director, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, 2003-2007; Deputy Undersecretary of the Prime Minister of Türkiye, 2007-2010; Director, National Intelligence Agency of Türkiye, 2014-2023). Noting this composition that has been involved in Turkish foreign policy since the early 2010s, it is not therefore surprising to see these names actively influencing the course of Turkish foreign policy, as shown in the case of Hakan Fidan, a Turkish intelligent boss becoming the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2023. Interestingly, once a public
face of Turkish diplomacy, Ibrahim Kalin, is now taking a role as Director of the National Intelligence Agency of Türkiye.

Results and Discussion
The Discourse of ‘Democracy’ in Indonesian Foreign Policy

One of the most frequently mentioned discourses throughout the speeches and statements analyzed is the discourse of democracy. In the context of Indonesian foreign policymakers, especially in the early years of Yudhoyono’s presidency, it could be argued that there is a significant effort to link the ideas of democracy with Islamic values and modernity, thus known as the triad of ‘democracy, Islam and modernity’. The triad of was vigorously promoted by Yudhoyono and his foreign ministers, so much so that this could be called one of the rallying points of Indonesia’s foreign policy in Yudhoyono’s era. This triad was first formulated by Hassan Wirajuda when he served as a foreign minister to President Megawati Soekarnoputri. In his paper entitled “The Democratic Response”, Wirajuda told the readers from Western countries that Indonesia as a Muslim-majority country had already accepted democracy as a political norm. As a response toward increasingly active radical and terrorist movements within Muslim society, Indonesia is ready to participate in tackling such tendencies by establishing a new synthesis that would be called a synthesis of Islam and democracy, which will oppose any idea that correlates Islam with backwardness, close-mindedness, and authoritarianism (Wirajuda 2005, 15-19).

This idea of an Islam-democracy synthesis was later coupled with the idea of modernity by Yudhoyono in his speech to the Indonesian Council on World Affairs. Yudhoyono mentioned that Indonesia has three major potentials in its own hands: its status as one of the largest Muslim nations, one of the largest democracies, and one of the largest economies in the world due to the size of its population. Accordingly, Yudhoyono coupled all of these potentials under the slogan of ‘democracy, Islam, and modernity’, which symbolizes the transformation of Indonesia in the early 2000s. This slogan would enable Indonesia to become both the natural leader in ASEAN and pursue its larger visions in global politics. The triad of ‘democracy, Islam, modernity’ is also a representation of the synthesis of three different civilizations, thus allowing Indonesia to show itself as a
mediator between different civilizations (Yudhoyono 2005b; Yudhoyono 2009a).

It is also important to see how Indonesian chief policymakers were correlating the discourse of democracy with its past civilizational heritage that has connections to democratic values. Indonesia has Pancasila as its national ideology, which was taken from Negarakrta Agama, an ancient religious text which explained the relations between state and religious belief. In the modern context, Pancasila was thus used by Soekarno to summarize Indonesia’s moral, social and political principles. One of Pancasila’s core principles is democracy, based on true popular deliberation, as shown in the practice of musyawarah (village/popular deliberation) seen in Indonesia’s rural communities (Wirajuda 2008a; Yudhoyono 2009a).

According to Yudhoyono, for democracy to become widely adopted especially in non-Western settings, democracy should pass through a trial and error process by testing and matching democratic values with existing local values that reflect the spirit of democracy, and thus democracy could become a homegrown practice that does not need to follow the exact Western formula in its implementation (Yudhoyono 2010). In this context, it should be emphasized that there is no single model in the journey of democratization. Therefore, to ease the learning process of democracy, Yudhoyono argues for a learning process that involves countries sharing their respective experiences on democratization to avoid any ‘forced’ democratization that would risk political destabilization (Wirajuda 2005; Yudhoyono 2010a; Yudhoyono 2010b; Yudhoyono 2010c; Natalegawa, 2012).

Democratization, in the view of Indonesian policymakers, should pass through a difficult and long process of dialogues and peaceful resolution as one of the principal aspects to ensure a smooth political transition (Wirajuda 2005; Wirajuda 2008a; Wirajuda 2008b; Natalegawa 2010a; Natalegawa 2010b; Natalegawa 2010c; Yudhoyono 2008; Yudhoyono 2010a; Yudhoyono 2013b). Interestingly, democracy was also noted to be not the only panacea to all problems in international politics (Wirajuda 2008b; Yudhoyono 2010a). In his speeches, Wirajuda emphasized the need to actualize the value of democracy. It is necessary for democratizing countries to also advance several values, such as decentralization and good governance. Yudhoyono argued that decentralization matters to democracy and strengthens the political system,
as long as the existing institutions and rules are also strengthened. A strong institutional system, combined with the commitment to the rule of law will be the best way to avoid the rise of a strong leader that will reverse the course of democratization. Hence, Yudhoyono (2010c; 2011; 2013b) emphasized that the way to manage democracy, which accepts extremes and differences, is to have professional and trustworthy institutions. To ensure the continuation of the democratic spirit, Indonesian policymakers also connect the discourse of democracy with the notion of moderation. The aspect of moderation here is often correlated with religious attitudes. According to Wirajuda (2005), a moderate religious attitude that opposes the use of violence and authoritarianism would help strengthen social justice and moral battle against corruption and vigilant radicalism.

As an inseparable part of Indonesia’s discourse of ‘democracy’, modernity is often correlated with discourses such as ‘connectivity’ and ‘development’. Globalization has resulted in inevitable modernization, and the world is becoming increasingly connected. Yudhoyono (2005b) suggests that it is important to reconsider the way to build connections between differing actors, as this would ensure the effective communication between global actors to solve regional and global problems. Yudhoyono also connects the modernity discourse with the triad of ‘Democracy, Islam, and Modernity’ with the word ‘civilization’. With increasing connectivity made possible by the modernization of technology, Yudhoyono said that modernity has made possible the closer interaction between different civilizations, thus creating a confluence of civilizations (Yudhoyono 2009b). Modernization is also correlated with the notion of ‘development’, since development makes possible the advancement of political, social and cultural sectors in Indonesian society (Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations 2010: 352-355; Yudhoyono 2009b; Yudhoyono 2009c; Natalegawa 2010a).

It is peculiar to see that Yudhoyono’s presidency often engages with the notion of development. Almost exclusively, this notion is deeply linked to the issue of freedom and peace. This triad of development, freedom, and peace was initially promoted by Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa in 2010 when he delivered a speech at the Global Movement for Democracy forum that was held in Krakow, Poland. In this forum, Natalegawa mentioned the importance of assuring a stable political
all which will strengthen peace in the country. This condition is also considered as Indonesia’s silent revolution. Since the 2010s, it could be seen that more Indonesian policymakers consciously chose the notion of development to represent the success story of democratizing Indonesia.

One of the most interesting deliberations that ever occurred in the use of development as an official discourse of Indonesian foreign policy is the dilemma between economic development and political development. Indonesia presented its case by displaying examples that oppose the notion that economic development should be prioritized over political development. Instead, Indonesia brought forward the idea that both economic and political development should go hand-in-hand. Additionally, Wirajuda emphasized that countries need to have a good governance system and focus on human development to solve the dilemma (Permanent Representative of Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations 2010: 353-354).

Natalegawa (2010a) argued that development should pave the way for democracy, and democracy should also make development possible. In Yudhoyono’s terminology, this means that there will be no political stability without development, and there will be no stability and development without human rights and democracy. Essentially, Indonesia and other formerly colonized countries are fighting for unfinished freedom, where the condition obliges these less-developed countries to prioritize education and address inequality before anything else.

On the other hand, Indonesia also projects its democratization goals onto the regional and global governance structure. Since the early years of Indonesia’s democratization, it has been clear that Indonesia wishes for its surrounding region to follow democratic principle and for the regional organization (ASEAN) to democratize its mechanism and organizational structure to enable policy transformation at the regional level. Yudhoyono (2005a) argued that member countries of ASEAN need to close significant gaps between the leaders and the people they led. Additionally, Yudhoyono (2005a) thought it necessary to institutionalize human rights norms as core organizational values in ASEAN. In one of his speeches to a Cambodian audience, Natalegawa (2010a) also emphasized the importance of the ASEAN Charter which stands for the values of human rights, democracy, and freedom. Therefore, countries that have acceded to the ASEAN
Charter should aim to construct a people-centered ASEAN for a better future for the people of Southeast Asian.

In the global context, Indonesia presented the idea of democracy and democratization of global governance by promoting multilateral diplomacy. The promotion of multilateral diplomacy should always be accompanied by the democratization of global governance, which empowers and capacitates the actors involved. Hence, transparency and openness should be the core of any global organization who are willing to democratize itself. Yudhoyono (2012) also advanced an argument that global organizations such as the United Nations should capture the changing landscape of global politics which has turned into a scene filled with engagement from multiple actors and activated within different regional centers. In this context, the United Nations should give equal voice to all member states, regardless of size and capacity. Furthermore, Yudhoyono reminded the United Nations of the urgency to reform the veto system that limits the participation of countries in deciding global issues (Yudhoyono 2009b; Yudhoyono 2010a; Yudhoyono 2012).

Lastly, as Indonesia was portraying itself to be a democratic country, it is obvious that Indonesia’s democratic identity involves the process of ‘othering’ those countries that are still not committed to democratic values. One of the strongest ‘Others’ to Indonesia’s democratic self is the notion of terrorism and separatism (Wirajuda, 2002, 20). This is often seen in Indonesia’s official statements, particularly regarding terrorism. Whenever Indonesia addresses terrorism in its official statements, one of the terms often repeated as a correct measure to tackle terrorism is the discourse of moderation. In certain aspects, the word ‘moderation’ reflects an Islamic teaching known as ‘wasathiyah’ or the ‘principle of middle way’ (Anwar 2010b).

Additionally, Indonesia has been trying to distance itself from dictatorial regimes. In one of his speeches, Yudhoyono pointed out that dictatorial leaders often use the notion of ‘strong leadership’ to cover for their undemocratic leadership (Yudhoyono 2013a). In facing authoritarian and undemocratic countries like Myanmar, Indonesia presents itself as a model and potential savior to guide Myanmar out of its missteps through reform packages.
Besides these forms of ‘Other’, Indonesia also believes that, in some ways, colonial powers bear responsibility for the deterioration of political order in their former colonies due to the forceful imposition of democracy (Wirajuda 2008a, Yudhoyono 2010c). Figure 3 shows how Indonesia reflect its position vis-à-vis its others (Western and authoritarian countries). It displays that Indonesia views Western conception of democracy as being in opposition to the Indonesian conception of democracy.

The Discourse of ‘Democracy’ in Turkish Foreign Policy

In the 2010 edition of the Conference of Turkish Ambassadors, Türkiye’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmet Davutoğlu mentioned that Turkish true power lies in its democratic credentials (Davutoğlu 2010). In the 2000s, it could be said that one of the most powerful discourses in Turkish foreign policy was the discourse of democracy. To comprehend the context and extent of this discourse, its development should be analyzed.
meticulously. The first attempt to engage the discourse of democracy in Turkish official foreign policy was made by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as Prime Minister of Türkiye. Erdoğan used the terminology of ‘conservative democracy’ to introduce Turkish new identity and its unique approach to democracy. This terminology was created by Yalçın Akdoğan, one of Erdoğan’s closest associates and one of the chief ideologists of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AK Parti/Justice and Development Party) (Akdoğan 2007). According to Erdoğan, Türkiye had been experiencing a ‘top-down’ and ‘forceful’ process of democratization. Erdoğan emphasized that the ‘new Türkiye’ that AK Parti wishes to build focused on constructing a modernizing Türkiye without alienating tradition, accepting locality while harmonizing with universal values, staying rational without refusing civilizational values, and pursuing a change that is not radical (Erdoğan 2004b).

Through this definition, Erdoğan aimed to present Türkiye as a country focused on building a democratic system based on dialogue between diverse identities, resulting in resolution and consensus. With the democratization processes building up since the late 1980s and reaching their peak in the early 2000s, Erdoğan (2004a) was confident enough to say that Türkiye could be a model for its surrounding countries, especially the Muslim world. Türkiye also made other claims that are a continuation of its former claims, such as being able to become a bridge country mediating differences among civilizations. In this aspect, Türkiye emphasized that its status as a secular, democratic, and Muslim-majority country helped it to play this role (Erdoğan 2004a; Erdoğan 2004b).

The Turkish model was then used by Turkish foreign policymakers to display the success story and exemplary case for the Turkish idea of conservative democracy (Gül 2007, 560). Abdullah Gül who was acting as Turkish foreign minister, even said that the Turkish model disproves the idea of Middle East exceptionalism. The idea of Middle East exceptionalism argues that Muslim countries cannot be committed to democracy and human rights. By elaborating on Türkiye’s experience of implementing ‘conservative democracy’, Türkiye displayed that Muslim countries can respect democracy while aligning modern political values with Islamic political ideology.

During the early 2000s, Türkiye also faced significant challenges in maintaining its security from threats in the region while advancing its
democracy within its border. As chief foreign policy advisor to the Turkish Prime Minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu emphasized the importance of keeping a delicate balance between ‘calibrated freedom’ and ‘philosophical security’ to address the security dilemma that Türkiye was facing at that time (Davutoğlu 2001). Abdullah Gül (2007, 708) thought it would be necessary for all actors in the Turkish domestic arena to truly understand and collectively participate in maintaining the progress of democracy and development while keeping security. All these efforts, as told by Erdoğan, are a way to substantively understand and internalize the process of democratization. This is because, as Erdoğan (2004a) said, democracy relies heavily on process, and this has to be followed collectively by all actors to ensure a healthy process of political transformation in Türkiye and the Middle East.

To ensure a smooth political transition, the adviser to the Prime Minister of Türkiye, İbrahim Kalın, argued that it would be necessary for Türkiye to promote the idea of conservative modernity that would suit the needs of Middle Eastern countries. Hence, the democratization process in Türkiye and the Middle East needs to avoid the tendency of othering practices and encourage rational and moral frameworks in political deliberations. Throughout this process, challenges such as extremism and political instability might persist. Erdoğan (2012) stated that the only way to address these difficulties is through continuous political reflection and evaluation of democratization processes.

This evaluation process helped Türkiye navigate its democratization journey. As Türkiye spread its model and promoted its principle of conservative democracy, it also aimed to make its democratization agenda in Türkiye and the Middle East human-oriented. Similar to the vision of establishing conservative democracy, this human-oriented goal means that all progress and development programs in the Middle East should harmonize local morality with universal values (Erdoğan 2004b; Kalın 2011; Davutoğlu 2012a; Davutoğlu 2012b; Time Türk 2013; Davutoğlu, 2014). By following this approach, it is expected that the democratization process in Türkiye and the Middle East would be organic and holistic, ensuring the restoration of the political system in the region. Turkish policymakers also emphasized that the basis of Turkish foreign policy in the region is to pursue a people-oriented and people-driven transformation in the Middle East. In one of his speeches, Erdoğan (2011a) even said that the
victory of democracy in Türkiye (i.e. the victory of AK Parti as the pro-democracy party in Türkiye) will reverberate throughout the Middle East. In his own words, “Ankara kadar Şam kazanmıştır (Damascus will be winning as Ankara wins”).

Using its human-oriented foreign policy, Türkiye faced a significant challenge when the Arab Spring swept through the Middle East. The Arab Spring became a serious test for Turkish foreign policymakers as Türkiye tried to assist newly democratizing countries in the region. It faced much criticism, especially from authoritarian Middle Eastern countries like Syria and Egypt. Türkiye was blamed for its political activism and interventionism in these countries, which undermined its core principles of building better relationships with its neighboring countries. When Türkiye took the risk of being alienated as the ‘sole defender of democracy’ in the Middle East by international powers, Türkiye redefined its role and evaluated it as ‘precious loneliness’: Turkish status as a ‘defender of democracy’ gave its foreign policy a strong, influential, and principled position (Time Türk 2013).

In this moment of regional crisis, Kalın emphasized the importance of distinguishing countries that truly stand up for democracy and those that do not. He reinforced this division by stating that countries which do not defend democracy ‘have no soul nor principle’ (Time Türk 2013). Erdoğan (2014) also remarked that countries supporting authoritarian systems were hypocritical since they did not genuinely believe in democracy. Gül added that leaders who ignore the popular will would have no place in the future Middle East. As Türkiye developed this foreign policy activism, it was also accompanied by a liberal transformation in the foreign policymaking process. Hakan Fidan (2013) noted that this liberal transformation was evident in the involvement of Turkish civil society in Turkish foreign policy activism. Fidan (2013, 91) argued that this transformation demonstrated that Turkish democracy has been a success story and has already influenced the dynamics of Turkish foreign policy.

Besides advancing the discourse of democracy in the regional arena, Türkiye promoted the idea of democratizing global governance in the context of the United Nations. İbrahim Kalın (2011) argued that the promotion of democracy would help Türkiye to increase its leverage in global politics amidst the injustice and unfairness occurring worldwide. Erdoğan (2011b) even publicly stated that the United Nations was already
an ineffective organization unable to address global politics effectively. Erdoğan (2012) also said that the United Nations had become an institution threatening the future of humanity due to its loyalty to the regime of fear created by the hegemonic powers.

Erdoğan stated that for the United Nations to work effectively once again and to have a say in global politics, it should democratize its functions and operations by not leaving global governance solely in the hands of the five permanent members. This position made Erdoğan well-known for his quote “The World is Bigger than Five (Dünya Beşten Büyüktür)”. Through this quote, Erdoğan criticized Western countries for not committing to the agenda of global governance reform (Erdoğan 2012). This labelling, along with the criticism towards authoritarian regimes, suggests that Türkiye considers both Western hegemonic power and authoritarian regimes in the Middle East as the ‘Others’ in its foreign policy discourse (Kalin 2015; Erdoğan 2012; Erdoğan 2014). As shown in

ULUL ALBAB: Jurnal Studi Islam, Vol. 25, No.1, 2024
the Figure 4, it is clear that Türkiye is endeavoring to challenge its ‘Other’ (especially Western countries) in its commitment to democratization and support for democratic change in the Middle East and the global order, as demonstrated in the case of United Nations.

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War brought about significant changes to international relations. A core question that emerged was how global politics and the scholarship of international relations would be shaped in the new post-Cold War era. As theorization in the field of international relations has deepened, the democratization process has accelerated. This research aims to understand the democratization process experienced by developing countries, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and how these countries integrate their democratization process into their respective foreign policy discourses.

This research focuses on Indonesia and Türkiye as case studies. Both countries have traditional foreign policy doctrines that faced significant challenges after the Cold War. As both countries experience democratization and commit to the agenda of democracy, they also make democracy a call to action and a core visions in their foreign policy conduct. When Indonesia and Türkiye dedicated themselves as advocates for democracy in their respective regions, their foreign policies, showcasing democracy as a success story, eventually redefined their identity. This redefinition of identity became more visible during times of crisis, particularly after the 9/11 attacks and the Arab Spring in the Middle East.

Using Hansen’s discourse method to unfold the discursive dynamics of both Indonesian and Turkish foreign policies, this research has two important findings. One significant similarity in their foreign policy discourses is that both countries localize the democratic norm and emphasize local experiences of democratization as opposed to the forceful imposition of democratization processes. Another important aspect is the regional activism of Indonesia and Türkiye in defending the cause of democracy and promoting democratization in their immediate regions through localizing and contextualizing democratic norms to make democracy a widely accepted norm in the regional order. Finally, both countries aspire to pursue the agenda of democratization in global governance, particularly within the United Nations.
Acknowledgement
This research is an updated and enhanced version of my master’s thesis written and successfully defended back in 2018 under the title of 2000’li Yıllarda Endonezya ve Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası: Karşılaştırmalı Söylem Analizi (Indonesian and Turkish Foreign Policy in 2000s: A Comparative Discourse Analysis). My Master’s study was funded by the Türkiye Scholarship program, managed by the Presidency of Turks Abroad and Related Communities, Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Republic of Türkiye (Yurtdışı Türkler ve Akraba Topluluklar Başkanlığı, T.C. Kültür ve Türizm Bakanlığı).

References


Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip. 2004b. “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’ın 15 Ocak 2004 tarihli konuşması.” Vikikaynak. (Online) https://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/Recep_Tayyip_
Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip. 2011a. “Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın 22 Şubat 2011 tarihli AK Parti grup toplantısında yaptığı konuşma.” Vikikaynak. (Online)
https://tr.wikisource.org/wiki/Recep_Tayyip_Erdoğan%27%C4%B1n_22_%C5%9Eubat_2011_tarihli_AK_Parti_grup_toplant%C4%B1s%C4%B1nda_yapt%C4%B1%5F%C4%B1_konu%C5%9Fma.

Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip. 2011b. “Address by H.E. Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey to the General Debate of the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly.” United Nations General Assembly. (Online)
https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/6

Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip. 2012. “Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'ın Bali Demokrasi Forumu'nda Yaptığı Konuşması [Transkript].” (Online)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=63JIhiZnk2E.

Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip. 2014. “Birleşmiş Milletler 69'uncu Genel Kurulu Genel Görüşmelerinde Yaptıkları Konuşma.” Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanlığı. (Online)
https://www.tccb.gov.tr/konusmalar/353/2936/birlesmis-milletler-


DOI: https://doi.org/10.5728/indonesia.92.0001.


Indonesia.


Yudhoyono, S. B. 2005b. On Building the ASEAN Community: The Democratic Aspect: A Lecture by H.E. Dr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of the Republic of Indonesia on the Occasion of the 38th Anniversary of the Association of Southeast Asian


